Language Evolution and Computation Research Unit
Department of Theoretical and Applied Linguistics
University of Edinburgh
jim@ling.ed.ac.uk

abstract

``We should search for the ancestry of language not in prior systems of animal communication but in prior representational systems.'' (Bickerton, Derek, 1990, Language and Species, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. p.23.)

It can be agreed that nothing of the distinctively complex structure of modern languages can be attributed to ancestry in animal communication systems. But how much of the complex structure of modern languages can be attributed to ancestry in pre-linguistic representational systems? The essential differences between an internal (cognitive) representation system and a communication system are as follows.

A communication system maps external forms (such as speech sounds or manual signs), via mental structures, to meanings (where many, if not all, meanings relate to external objects, events or situations). A communication system is typically public, shared by many individuals{But this is not crucial, as for example the last living speaker of a dying language can still be said to possess a communication system..

A representation system lacks the mapping to external forms, and merely provides mental structures mapped to meanings. It is assumed that the meanings dealt with by any such representation system relate to, or denote, external situations. There would be no practical advantage in having a representation system which was not in some way related to the world outside the mind possessing it.

Thus a communication system properly includes a representation system. There are elements in a communication system that are not part of the inherent representation system. Any aspects of a communication system which pertain only to the mapping between external forms (sounds, signs) and the internal cognitive representation system are not part of the representation system per se.

Languages are very complex, highly structured communication systems. The question arises how much of the structure of a language is only part of the communicative aspects of the system, that is, how much of it does not belong to the inherent representation system. The view that linguistic structure derives from representation systems existing prior to language can only be sustained to the extent that there is no structure that is only part of the communicative aspect of a language system.

So how much of language structure is purely representational, and how much of it is part of the mapping to external forms? One cannot quantify such questions, but the answer is that almost all of the complex structure of languages belongs to their communicative aspect, and very little to their purely representational aspect. This paper will survey the range of linguistic structures that relate only to the mapping between internal representations and external forms.

The fundamental universal structural characteristic known as ``duality of patterning'', whereby languages are organized at two levels of structure, namely phonology and morphosyntax, has no motivation in a purely representational system, but plausible arguments can be advanced for its communicative adaptiveness.

Obviously, all of phonological structure belongs in the communicative aspect of linguistic structure. All of the following aspects of structure play purely communicative roles, and no role in non-communicative representation: Phonemic structure, tonemic structure, phonotactics (which organizes the universal classes of vowels and consonants in patterns such as the sonority hierarchy), phonological processes of assimilation and dissimilation (including vowel harmony and consonant harmony), other allophonic processes, syllabic and moraic structure, intonation and rhythm. The phonological component of a language comprises a very significant proportion of its structure.

On the morphosyntactic side of the duality of patterning, the universal distinction between morphology and syntax (however that is drawn) plays no role in non-communicative representation. This distinction rests on the discrimination by languages of a level of words, which are small-to-middle-sized units distinct from both semantically atomic morphemes and higher level syntactic units such as phrases. Within morphology, various structural features, such as the layering of inflectional morphemes outside derivational morphemes, and the inventory of structural devices used in word-formation (affixation, suppletion, fusion, cliticization, reduplication, compounding) also play no purely representational role. These are processes affecting the external forms of languages.

Within syntax, many of the complex structural phenomena that have attracted study, such as case marking, anaphor-antecedent relationships, switch-reference devices, control by verbal predicates of the interpretation of their complement clauses, transformations of various sorts (e.g. passivization, topicalization, question formation) and the constraints on such processes, play no role in non-communicative representation. Linear ordering of elements, with which much of syntax is concerned, likewise plays no non-communicative role. Also fundamental to syntactic structure are lexical classes somewhat autonomous of semantics, such as Noun, Verb, Adjective and Preposition; to the extent that such classes are autonomous, they play no role in semantic representation. Other commonly found grammatico-lexical categories, such as grammatical gender (Noun classes), would seem to serve no representational purpose, although they may contribute to the redundancy of utterances, thereby serving a communicative purpose. Grammatical agreement (concord), which is widespread, also clearly plays no purely representational role.

Some aspects of linguistic structure may indeed plausibly be derived from non-linguistic, representational, structure. These include some (but not all) aspects of hierarchical organization in syntax. But the broad conclusion from the above survey of non-representational aspects of linguistic structure is that attempts to derive linguistic structure, in an evolutionary account, from previously existing cognitive representational structure must fail, for a large slice of linguistic structure. Correspondingly, we can seek evolutionary explanations (broadly conceived) for much (though not all) of the typical structure of languages in the demands of communication in the human environment.

 Conference site: http://www.infres.enst.fr/confs/evolang/