

Towards Name-based Trust and Security for Content-centric Network

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Motivations

- **Several Information Centric Network (ICN) architecture have been proposed for future Internet**
 - Content-centric network (CCN) / named-data network (NDN)
 - NetInf, PSIRP, DONA, ...
- **Security is a built-in feature in ICN**
 - With the focus on content integrity and confidentiality
 - Trust is a pre-requisite for security
- **PKI-based trust management**
 - Not very scalable
 - S-BGP, soBGP, psBGP, SPV, ...
 - Certificate distribution/management is complex
 - Deriving trust from key certificate is not efficient

Our Proposal

- **Name-based trust and security**
 - Leverage named content in network
- **Deriving trust from existing infrastructures**
 - Email, phone number, friend list, ...
 - Leveraging social/admin/owner relationships, ...
- **Identity-based signature (IBS) for content integrity verification**
 - Identities as public keys
 - Device id, content name/prefix, etc
 - Reduce the complexity of public key certificate management
- **Identity-based encryption (IBE) for content confidentiality**
 - Flexible secure data dissemination
 - No need to build a secure channel before content publish

IBC Algorithms

- **A trusted entity: private key generator (PKG)**
 - common trusted entity
 - but does not do certificate signing and key distribution
- **id: a public identity as a string**
 - Name, prefix, email, ...
- **(pb, pr): a public/private key pair generated from id**

PKG:

Setup: $1^k \rightarrow SP, MSK$, (PKG publishes SP, and saves MSK)

GeneratePrK: (id, MSK) $\rightarrow pr_id$

Sig:

Sign: (m, id, pr_id) $\rightarrow s$


Verify: (s, m, SP, id) $\rightarrow true/false$

Enc:

Enc: (m, id, SP) $\rightarrow c$

Dec: (c, pr_id) $\rightarrow m$

Name-based Signature for CON



Secure Channel



Authenticated Channel




Data Transmission




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Name-based Encryption for CON



Secure Channel Authenticated Channel Data Transmission

Data Format




- *enc_id*: the target name prefix that can decrypt
- *sign_id*: the name prefix that used for signature verification
- *pkg.sp*: the *SP* of the *PKG* (or its hash) corresponding the name prefix
- *sig*: signed hash of the content name, metadata, and ciphertext.

A Hybrid Scheme: PKI + IBC

- **Pure IBC is not scalable for Internet**
 - Centralized PKG is not scalable
 - Secure distribution of private key can be an issue
 - Should rely on some authentication mechanism
 - Authentication of PKG's SP can be an issue
 - May rely on another trust management infrastructure
- **Proposal: a hybrid trust management scheme: PKI + IBC**
 - PKG/NRS are domain/AS level services
 - Distribute private key within domain
 - Each organization can implement its own key distribution, with authentication mechanisms
 - For example, in an enterprise, username/password, Kerberos, IAM (LDAP/Active Directory)
 - Distribute and verify SP with inter-domain PKI-based trust management
 - Domain level PKI is available actually:
 - DNSSEC, IPsec, SSL, RPKI, etc
 - A content publisher or consumer only needs to trust a few PKI-CAs

Hybrid Scheme: PKI + IBC



- PKG/NRS are within domain/AS level
- PKG issues private key for local names
- PKG.SP is certified by PKI CA
- certificate management complexity:
 - Pure PKI: $O(nxm)$
 - n - space of devices/users/hosts/services/names
 - m - space of domains
 - Hybrid: $O(m)$

IBC is good for user/app/device/host/service level trust and security

While PKI is good for domain/AS level

Discussion

- **Supporting flexible security policies:**
 - Group signing
 - Multiple signatures for single name
 - With different prefixes
 - Delegated signing
- **Self PKG**
 - Self-signed PKG.SP
 - Good for P2P, social network, and ad-hoc network
- **Private key revocation**
 - Private key is built with timestamp augmented id
 - Bob@huawei.com || Oct-2011


Implementation

- **CCNx-Latitude:**
 - A location sharing application on Android
 - Over CCNx project




- Malicious CCNx client
- Sniff location data
 - Publish fake location


Alice: Sender



- React interests by generating content of location with name *ccnx:/phone-number/loc*
- Encrypted with receiver's *phone-number*
- Signed with sender's key
- Pre-loaded to device SD card




Bob: Receiver




- Periodically send interest for *ccnx:/phone-number/loc*
- Sig verification and decryption
- Show location on map

CCNx-Latitude Protocols



Content Name and Metadata



- `enc_id`: Bob's phone#
- `sign_id`: Alice's phone#
- `pkg.sp`: the SP of the PKG corresponding the identity
- `sig`: IBS(Alice's pr, ciphertext, Alice phone#)

Evaluation

- **Un-optimized implementation**
 - Android 2.3
 - Google Nexus S
 - Java BF-IPC implementation: <http://crypto.stanford.edu/psc/>
- **BF-IBC is almost 10 times slower than RSA operations**
 - Due to expensive paring operation
 - But data size independent
- **Performance improvement**
 - key encapsulation mechanism
 - IBE work on an AES key
 - AES key is used for real data encryption
 - For 5MB data, the performance is < 3% more than RSA

Conclusion

- **We propose IBC for named content in ICN**
 - Name/prefix as public key
 - Good for CCN/NDN with user readable names
 - IBS for content integrity and authenticity verification
 - IBC for content encryption
- **We propose a hybrid trust management scheme**
 - IBC for intra-domain trust management
 - PKI for inter-domain trust management
- **We implement CCNx-Latitude for PoC:**
 - CCNx project
 - Secure and private location sharing with CCN

Ongoing and Future Work

- **Booting trust for group communication in ICN**
 - With hierarchical content names
- **Group-based security for data sharing with ICN**
 - Dynamic group memberships
 - Multicast encryption
- **Secure mobility in ICN**
 - Enabling virtual group in ICN
- **Secure routing in ICN**

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THANKS!

