



Une école de l'IMT



Design and Verification of Secure Autonomous Vehicles

Letitia W. Li, Ludovic Apvrille, Annie Bracquemond

letitia.li@telecom-paristech.fr

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
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
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Attacks on Connected Vehicles



Attacks on Autonomous Vehicles



EVITA Project



- ▶ FP7 project ended in 2012
- ▶ E-safety Vehicle Intrusion Protected Applications
- ▶ Design of architecture for secure automotive on-board networks
- ▶ EVITA does not address side-channel attacks i.e. hardware is assumed to be tamper-resistant
- ▶ Several EVITA-compatible ECUs on the market (STM, Bosch, etc.)

Security Requirements




- ▶ Authenticity of vehicle software and data
- ▶ Authenticity of vehicle communication
- ▶ Confidentiality of vehicle communication
- ▶ Integrity of vehicle communication
- ▶ ...

EVITA Results




- ▶ Security Protocols
 - ▶ Protocols are CAN compatible
 - ▶ Formally verified with SysML-Sec
- ▶ APIs
 - ▶ Integration in Autosar
- ▶ Specification of Hardware Security Modules

Hardware Security Modules



EVITA Architecture



How to Design a Secure Automotive System?

"Those who fail to plan, plan to fail."

Benjamin Franklin


- ▶ Use of a model-driven approach (**SysML-Sec**)
- ▶ Support of safety, performance and **security** (formal) verification

SysML-Sec Methodology




TTool


An open source toolkit
provided by



Methodology in detail





Autonomous Vehicle under Design





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

Attack Tree



Application View



Architecture/Mapping View



```

graph TD
    subgraph Analysis
        R[Requirements] --> A[Architecture]
        UC[User Cases/Scenarios] --> A
        AT[Attack Tree] --> A
        A --> AV[Architecture with Vulnerabilities]
    end
    subgraph HW_SW_Partitioning [HW/SW Partitioning]
        AV --> H[Hardware]
        AV --> S[Software]
        H --> HT[Hardware with Threats]
        S --> SAP[Software with Attack Paths]
    end
    subgraph Software_Design [Software Design]
        SAP --> ESP[Evaluation of Security/Quality Performance]
        ESP --> SD[Software Design]
    end
    ESP --> A
    ESP --> HT
    ESP --> SAP
    SD --> AV
    SD --> HT
    SD --> SAP
    SD --> ESP
    SD --> SD

```

Analysis

- Requirements
- User Cases/Scenarios
- Attack Tree
- Architecture
- Architecture with Vulnerabilities

HW/SW Partitioning


- Hardware
- Software
- Hardware with Threats
- Software with Attack Paths

Software Design

- Evaluation of Security/Quality Performance
- Software Design


Annotations:

- Feasibility of attack tree to target specific hardware components (linking Attack Tree to Architecture)
- Focus on reduction of threat (linking Hardware with Threats to Hardware)
- Reconsideration of threat (linking Software with Attack Paths to Software)




The diagram illustrates a security analysis framework across three main phases: Analysis, HWSW Partitioning, and Software Design.


- Analysis:** This phase starts with **Requirements**, **User Goals/Strategies**, and **Attack Time**. These lead to **Application**, **Architecture**, and **Mitigation**. A note indicates that the **Architecture** must be **Compatible with User Goals/Strategies**.
- HWSW Partitioning:** This phase involves **Security Requirements**, **Application with Security**, **Hardware**, and **Hardware with added risks**. **Application with Security** leads to **Focus on hardware of interest**. **Hardware** and **Hardware with added risks** lead to **Reconsideration of threat**.
- Software Design:** This phase involves **Reconsideration of hardware design**, **Software Design**, and **Evaluation of Security/Quality/Performance**. **Reconsideration of hardware design** leads to **Software Design**, which then leads to **Evaluation of Security/Quality/Performance**. A red arrow points from **Evaluation of Security/Quality/Performance** back to **Focus on hardware of interest**.




Reachability Graph




Simulation



ProVerif




Security Verification Results



Impact of Security on Performance and Safety


- ▶ Encryption/Decryption occupy execution cycles
- ▶ Communications increase due to key exchange, increased message size

Model Simulation




14000 cycles

Secured Model



17000 cycles

Secured with HSM



16000 cycles

Test of Security Countermeasures



Conclusion and Future Work

Contributions

- ▶ New security considerations for autonomous vehicles
- ▶ Increased connectivity introduces vulnerabilities
- ▶ Model-Driven approach towards modeling and verification of (automotive) embedded systems

Future Development

- ▶ Iterations between requirements, attacks and partitioning solutions
- ▶ Modeling the relationship between safety and security
- ▶ Better relations between partitioning and subsequent modeling stages

Thank You!

References

TTool: ttool.telecom-paristech.fr

SysML-Sec:

<http://sysml-sec.telecom-paristech.fr/>

Personal website:

<http://perso.telecom-paristech.fr/~apvrille>

