

IV) Pointwise Maximal Leakage

1) Some subjects that could be studied for a wider understanding

- Differential Privacy (DP)
- Local Differential Privacy (LDP)
- Information Privacy
- Differential Indistinguishability
- Quantitative Information Flow
- g -leakage Framework (studied above)
- ML Framework (studied above)
- Privacy Loss Random Variable

2) Understanding the limitation of ML that has been pointed out

“The maximal leakage is defined for the average outcome Y ”

From what I understand, is that ML is a characteristic of the channel, but does not tell how much a specific outcome for Y leaks.

Example: We consider $X = Y = \{0, 1, 2\}$, and the following channels:

$$P_{Y|X} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} & 0 \\ 0 & \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} \end{bmatrix}, \quad Q_{Y|X} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{2}{3} & \frac{1}{6} & \frac{1}{6} \\ \frac{1}{6} & \frac{2}{3} & \frac{1}{6} \\ \frac{1}{6} & \frac{1}{6} & \frac{2}{3} \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow \text{Same ML equal to } \log(2)$$

But if $Y=3$ then this is an insane leakage for $P_{Y|X}$ but not for $Q_{Y|X}$.

3) Threat Model Setup: the guessing adversary

Suppose X is a random variable over \mathcal{X} . The output of the channel is given by Y of the finite alphabet \mathcal{Y} . This channel is called privacy mechanism.

An adversary is interested in guessing $u \in \mathcal{U}$ that is a possibly randomized function of X characterized by $P_{u|X}$. The adversary observes the outcome $y \in \text{Supp}(Y)$, and deduces $\hat{u} \in \mathcal{U}$, by some $P_{\hat{u}|Y}$. We define:

$$l_u(X \rightarrow y) = \log \frac{\sup_{P_{\hat{u}|Y}} P(\hat{u}=u | Y=y)}{\max_{u \in \mathcal{U}} P_u(u)}$$

← Guessing observing y
← Guessing without any observation

A natural inference is to take the supremum over $P_{u|X}$:

$$l(X \rightarrow y) = \sup_{P_{u|X}} l_u(X \rightarrow y) = \log \sup_{P_{u|X}} \frac{\sup_{P_{\hat{u}|Y}} P(\hat{u}=u | Y=y)}{\max_{u \in \mathcal{U}} P_u(u)}$$

We just defined the Pointwise Maximal Leakage.

Theorem 1:

$$l(X \rightarrow y) = \log \max_{z \in \text{Supp}(X)} \frac{P_{X|Y}(z|y)}{P_X(z)}$$

Proof: In the proof, we use the following lemma. Let define as Issa did:

$$\mathcal{L}(X \rightarrow Y)[u] = \sup_{P_{\hat{u}|Y}} \log \frac{\sum_y P(\hat{u}=u | Y=y) P_Y(y)}{\max_{u \in \mathcal{U}} P_u(u)} = \log \frac{\sum_y \max_{u \in \mathcal{U}} P_{u|Y}(u, y)}{\max_{u \in \mathcal{U}} P_u(u)}$$

Lemma 1: $e^{\mathcal{L}(X \rightarrow Y)[u]} = \sum_y P_Y(y) e^{l_u(X \rightarrow y)}$

Proof: The only thing that is not trivial, is to show that

$$\sum_y P_Y(y) \sup_{\hat{u}|Y} P(\hat{u}=u | Y=y) = \sup_{\hat{u}|Y} \sum_y P(\hat{u}=u | Y=y) P_Y(y)$$


But the key is to notice that the first sup should be $\sup_{\hat{u}|Y=y}$.

Taking the supremum over u , we get $e^{\mathcal{L}(X \rightarrow Y)} = \sum_y P_Y(y) e^{l(X \rightarrow y)}$

Therefore, $\sum_y \underbrace{P_Y(y) e^{l(X \rightarrow y)}}_{(1)} = \sum_y \underbrace{\max_{z \in \text{Supp}(X)} P_{Y|X}(y|z)}_{(2)}$.

But for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, $(1) \leq (2)$. Indeed, we know that the supremum is obtained when $u=x$ and \hat{u} is the best likelihood estimator, so (1) becomes:

$$\frac{\max_{z \in X} P_{XY}(z, y)}{\max_{z \in X} P_X(z)} \text{ and } (2) \text{ is } \max_{z \in X} P_{Y|X}(y|z).$$



Moreover, for all $\bar{z} \in X$, $P_X(\bar{z}) \leq \max_{z \in X} P_X(z)$

then, $P_X(\bar{z}) P_{Y|X}(y|\bar{z}) \leq \max_{z \in X} P_X(z) P_{Y|X}(y|z)$

and maximizing over \bar{z} , $\max_{z \in X} P_{XY}(z, y) \leq \max_{z \in X} P_X(z) \max_{z \in X} P_{Y|X}(y|z)$

We instantly get $(1) \leq (2)$ for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. Since $\sum (1) = \sum (2)$, we get $(1) = (2)$

and finally,

$$\begin{aligned} l(X \rightarrow y) &= \log \frac{\max_{z \in \text{Supp}(X)} P_{Y|X}(y|z)}{P_Y(y)} = \log \max_{z \in \text{Supp}(X)} \frac{P_{X|Y}(z|y)}{P_X(z)} \\ &= \log\left(\frac{1}{P_Y(y)}\right) - \log\left(\frac{1}{\max_{z \in \text{Supp}(X)} P_{Y|X}(y|z)}\right) \end{aligned}$$

Interpretation: i) $PML(y, x)$ decreases with $P_Y(y)$

The bigger $P_Y(y)$ is, the lower the leakage about y . (sounds logic: knowing that y happens does not give us a lot of information)

ii) $PML(y, x)$ increases with $\max_{x \in \text{Supp}(X)} P_{Y|X}(y|x)$

Here, $P_{Y|X}(y|x)$ is the "maximum possible leakage" one can get about y .

Remark: We know that ML is divergence-based, where

$$\mathcal{L}(X \rightarrow Y) = D_{\infty}(P_X P_Y^* | P_{X,Y})$$

Then PML also is divergence-based:

$$l(X \rightarrow y) = D_{\infty}(P_{X|Y=y} | P_X) \rightarrow \text{This gives us the perfect intuition about PML.}$$

4) Threat Model Setup: the g -leakage framework

As seen before, the **posterior vulnerability** in the g -leakage framework is given

by
$$V_g(X|Y) = \mathbb{E}_{\hat{Y}} [V_g(X|Y=\hat{Y})].$$

Naturally, a good choice for the **pointwise posterior vulnerability** is $V_g(X|Y=y)$, so that we can define the **dynamic g -leakage**: $l_g(X \rightarrow y) = \log \frac{V_g(X|Y=y)}{V_g(X)}$.

In the paper we have $\max_w \mathbb{E}[g(w, X) | Y=y]$ which is exactly the same.

This second expression makes the link with the randomized function POV expression, namely $l_u(X \rightarrow y)$. The **dynamic min-entropy leakage** is given by $l_{id}(X \rightarrow y)$.

5) Equivalence theorem

Theorem 2: The g -leakage and the u -leakage are equivalent:

$$\forall P_{u|X}, \exists g: X^2 \rightarrow [0,1], l_u \equiv l_g$$

$$\forall g: X^2 \rightarrow [0,1], \exists P_{u|X}, l_g \equiv l_u$$

Corollary 1: New definition of PML:

$$l(X \rightarrow Y) = \sup_{g: X^2 \rightarrow [0,1]} l_g(X \rightarrow Y)$$

6) Properties

We can make $l(X \rightarrow Y)$ conditional over a random variable Z . Each outcome $z \in \mathcal{Z}$ defines a conditional channel $P_{Y|X, Z=z}$. Then, the conditional leakage is easily defined as

$$l(X \rightarrow Y | Z) = \log \max_x \frac{P_{X|YZ}(x|y, z)}{P_{X|Z}(x|z)}.$$

For the denominator to be non zero, the max is taken over $\text{Supp}(X|Z=z)$.

Remark: $l(X \rightarrow Y | Z) = D_{\text{KL}}(P_{X|Y=y, Z=z} \| P_{X|Z=z}) = \max_x i_{XY|Z=z}(x, y)$

The mutual information density of a point $(x, y) \in X \times Y$ is given by the formula

$$i_{XY}(x; y) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } P_X(x)P_Y(y) = 0 \\ \log \frac{P_{XY}(x, y)}{P_X(x)P_Y(y)} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \in \mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty\}.$$

Results:

$$l(X \rightarrow Y) = \max_x i_{XY}(x; y)$$

$$I(X, Y) = \mathbb{E}(i(X; Y))$$

Properties: i) $0 \leq l(X \rightarrow y) \leq \max_x \log\left(\frac{1}{P_X(x)}\right)$

ii) If $X \rightarrow Y$ is totally random (i.e. independency) then $\forall y \in \mathcal{Y}, l(X \rightarrow y) = 0$.

iii) If $X \rightarrow Y$ is deterministic, then $\forall y \in \mathcal{Y}, l(X \rightarrow y) = \log\left(\frac{1}{P_Y(y)}\right)$.

iv) For two successive channels $X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z$, $l(X \rightarrow z) \leq l(Y \rightarrow z)$.

v) For two successive channels $X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z$, $l(X \rightarrow z) \leq \max_y l(X \rightarrow y)$.

vi) If the Markov graph $\begin{matrix} Z \\ | \\ X \rightarrow Y \end{matrix}$ holds, then
$$l(X \rightarrow y | z) = l(X \rightarrow y) - i(y; z)$$

vii) For the double channel $X \rightarrow Y, Z$, $l(X \rightarrow y, z) \leq l(X \rightarrow z) + l(X \rightarrow y | z)$.

Remark: iii) Imagine a deterministic channel that can be seen as a surjective function $X \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$. Then the leakage equals $\log\left(\frac{1}{P_Y(y)}\right)$ which is coherent since if $P_Y(y)$ is lower then the leakage should be higher.

Summary: We defined the dynamic g -leakage $l_g(X \rightarrow y) = \log \frac{V_g(X|Y=y)}{V_g(X)}$, from which we derive:

- The dynamic min-entropy leakage: $l_{id}(X \rightarrow y)$
- The pointwise maximal leakage: $\sup_g l_g(X \rightarrow y)$

7) Privacy guarantees

Instead of a fixed number $\mathcal{L}(X \rightarrow Y) = \log \mathbb{E}_Y(e^{l(X \rightarrow Y)})$, we consider the random variable $l(X \rightarrow Y)$ which has much more information

about the leakage. $l(X \rightarrow Y)$ is like a very rich measure of the leakage of a channel $X \rightarrow Y$. We then can construct lots of different guarantees:

Maximal Leakage guaranty: $E_Y(e^{l(X \rightarrow Y)}) \leq e^\epsilon$ (also called average case)

Almost-sure guaranty: $l(X \rightarrow Y) \leq \epsilon$ almost everywhere

or, equivalently, $\text{ess sup } l(X \rightarrow Y) \leq \epsilon$

↳ We say that $X \rightarrow Y$ satisfies ϵ -PML guaranty.

Tail bound guaranty: $\mathbb{P}_Y(l(X \rightarrow Y) > \epsilon) \leq \delta$

↳ We say that $X \rightarrow Y$ satisfies (ϵ, δ) -PML guaranty.

8) Some Data-Processing

Let A be a property of a channel. We say that A is:

- transitive if for any successive channels $X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z$, we have

$$A(X \rightarrow Y) \text{ and } A(Y \rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow A(X \rightarrow Z)$$

- closed under postprocessing if for any successive channels $X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z$:

$$A(X \rightarrow Y) \Rightarrow A(X \rightarrow Z)$$

- closed under preprocessing if for any successive channels $X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z$:

$$A(Y \rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow A(X \rightarrow Z)$$

- closed if for any successive channels $X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z$:

$$A(X \rightarrow Y) \text{ or } A(Y \rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow A(X \rightarrow Z)$$

Examples: i) Almost-sure guaranty is closed

ii) Tail bound guaranty is closed under post-processing.

Let \mathcal{E} be a measurable subset of \mathcal{Y} . Then the event maximal leakage (EML) is defined by $l(X \rightarrow \mathcal{E}) = \max_x \log \frac{P_{Y|X=x}(\mathcal{E})}{P_Y(\mathcal{E})} = \max_x \log (E_Y(i(x; Y))) - \log P_Y(\mathcal{E})$.

Another way to define it is by defining the following deterministic channel $Y \rightarrow Z$: $\mathcal{Z} = \{0, 1\}$ and $Z = \mathbb{1}_{\mathcal{E}}(Y)$. This way, $l(X \rightarrow \mathcal{E}) = l(X \rightarrow 1)$.

Proof: $l(X \rightarrow 1) = \max_x \frac{P_{Z|X}(1|x)}{P_Z(1)}$ but $P_Z(1) = P_Y(\mathcal{E})$

and $P_{Z|X}(1) = P_{Y|X=x}(\mathcal{E})$ so we got the result.

