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Maximizing the success of a side-channel attack

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State of the Art

- ♦ What distinguishes known distinguishers, in terms of distinctive features?
- Given a side-channel context, what is the best distinguisher amongst all known ones?
- Distinguishers were chosen as (arbitrary) **statistical tools** (correlation, difference of means, linear regression, etc.)
- [1] highlights that proposed distinguishers behave equivalent when using the same leakage model, only "statistical artifacts" can explain different behavior [2]
- The estimation of the statistical tools (esp. mutual information) is very crucial and effective on the success [3]

Side-channel analysis as a communication problem [4]



[1] Doget, Prouff, Rivain, and Standaert, JCEN, 2011 [2] Mangard, Oswald, and Standaert. IET, 2011 [3] Prouff and Rivain, IJACT, 2010. [4] Heuser, Rioul, and Guilley, under submission

\diamond Given a side-channel scenario, what is the best distinguisher, amongst all possible ones?

- Idea: Translate the problem of side-channel analysis into a problem of communication theory \rightarrow derive optimal distinguisher: maximize the success rate
- Leakage model is known to the attacker (Theorem 1)
 - Only statistical noise
 - Optimal decoding rule $\arg \max_{k} \left(\mathbb{P}\{k\} \cdot p(\mathbf{x}|\mathbf{y}(k)) \right)$ (template attack, profiling is possible)
 - The optimal distinguisher only depends on the noise distribution (e.g., Laplacian, uniform, Gaussian)
- Leakage model is partially unknown to the attacker (Theorem 2)
 - Statistical and epistemic noise
 - Leakage arises due to a weighted sum of bits, where the weights follow a normal distribution

Theorem 1: optimal distinguisher when the leakage model is known

If the leakage arises from $X = Y(k^{\star}) + N$ with known leakage model $Y(k) = \varphi(f(k,T))$ then the optimal distinguishing rule are

- Gaussian noise distribution: $\mathcal{D}_{opt}^{M,G}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_k \langle \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y}(k) \rangle \frac{1}{2} \| \mathbf{y}(k) \|_2^2$, where $\gamma = \frac{\sigma_{\alpha}^2}{\sigma^2}$ is the epistemic-to-stochastic-noise-ratio (ESNR).
- Uniform noise distribution: $\mathcal{D}_{opt}^{M,U}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_k \|\mathbf{x} \mathbf{y}(k)\|_{\infty}$,



Theorem 2: optimal distinguisher when the leakage model is partially unknown Let $\mathbf{Y}_{\alpha}(k) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \alpha_{j} [f(\mathbf{T}, k)]_{j}$, $\mathbf{Y}_{j}(k) = [f(\mathbf{T}, k)]_{j}$ and $\mathbf{X} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \alpha_{j} [f(T, k^{\star})]_{j} + N$ with $N \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$. Assuming weights are independently deviating normally from the Hamming weight model, then the optimal distinguishing rule is

$$\mathcal{D}^{\alpha,G}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{t}) = \arg\max_{k} \left(\gamma \langle \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y}(k) \rangle + \mathbf{1} \right)^{t} \cdot (\gamma Z(k) + I)^{-1} \cdot \left(\gamma \langle \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y}(k) \rangle + \mathbf{1} \right)$$
$$- \sigma_{\alpha}^{2} \ln \det(\gamma Z(k) + I) ,$$



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