# Belief revision, minimal change and relaxation: A general framework based on satisfaction systems, and applications to description logics 

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#### Abstract

Belief revision of knowledge bases represented by a set of sentences in a given logic has been extensively studied but for specific logics, mainly propositional, and also recently Horn and description logics. Here, we propose to generalize this operation from a modeltheoretic point of view, by defining revision in the abstract model theory of satisfaction systems. In this framework, we generalize to any satisfaction system the characterization of the AGM postulates given by Katsuno and Mendelzon for propositional logic in terms of minimal change among interpretations. In this generalization, the constraint on syntax independence is partially relaxed. Moreover, we study how to define revision, satisfying these weakened AGM postulates, from relaxation notions that have been first introduced in description logics to define dissimilarity measures between concepts, and the consequence of which is to relax the set of models of the old belief until it becomes consistent with the new pieces of knowledge. We show how the proposed general framework can be instantiated in different logics such as propositional, first-order, description and Horn logics. In particular for description logics, we introduce several concrete relaxation operators tailored for the description logic $\mathcal{A L C}$ and its fragments $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$ and $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L U}$, discuss their properties and provide some illustrative examples.


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## 1. Introduction

Belief change, the process that makes an agent's beliefs evolve with newly acquired knowledge, is one of the classical but still challenging problems in artificial intelligence. It is gaining more and more interest these days, due to the emergence of new logical-based knowledge representation frameworks enjoying good complexity properties, allowing them to tackle large scale knowledge bases, and to reason on massive datasets. Among these logical frameworks, one can mention Description Logics (DLs) and Horn Clause theories. Description logics, for instance, are now pervasive in many knowledge-based representation systems such as ontological reasoning, semantic web, scene understanding, cognitive robotics, to mention a few. In all these domains, the expert knowledge is not fixed, but rather a flux evolving over time, hence requiring the definition of rational change operators.

[^0]Studying the rationality of belief change operators, when knowledge bases are logical theories, i.e. sets of sentences in a given logic, goes back to the seminal work of Alchourròn, Gardenfors and Makinson [1], that gave birth to what is now known as AGM theory. Three change operations are studied within this framework, expansion, contraction and revision. Belief expansion consists in adding new knowledge without checking consistency, while both contraction and revision consist in consistently removing and adding new knowledge, respectively. We focus in this paper on belief revision.

Although defined in the abstract framework of logics given by Tarski [40] (so called Tarskian logics), postulates of the AGM theory make strong assumptions on the considered logics. Indeed, in [1] the considered logics have to be closed under the standard propositional connectives in $\{\wedge, \vee, \neg, \Rightarrow\}$, to be compact (i.e. inference depends on a finite set of axioms), and to satisfy the deduction theorem (i.e. entailment and implication are equivalent). While compactness is a standard property of logics, to be closed under the standard propositional connectives is more questionable. Indeed, many logics (called hereafter non-classical logics) such as description logics, equational logic or Horn clause logic, widely used for various modern applications in computing science, do not satisfy such a constraint. Recently, in many works, belief change has been studied in such non-classical logics [12,17,34,35]. For instance, Ribeiro et al. in [35] studied contraction at the abstract level of Tarskian logics, and recently Zhuang et al. in [42] proposed an extension of AGM contraction to arbitrary logics. The adaptation of the AGM postulates for revision for non-classical logics has been studied but only for specific logics, mainly description logics [16,17,28,29,31,33,41] and Horn logics [11,43]. The reason is that revision can be abstractly defined in terms of expansion and retraction following the Levi identity [23], but this requires the use of negation, which rules out some non-classical logics that do not consider this connective [34].

The AGM postulates were interpreted in terms of minimal change in [22], in the sense that the models of the revision should be as close as possible, according to some metric, to the models of the initial knowledge set. However, to the best of our knowledge, the generalization of the AGM theory with minimality criteria on the set of models of knowledge bases has never been proposed. The reason is that semantics is not explicit in the abstract framework of logics defined by Tarski.

We propose here to generalize AGM revision but in the abstract model theory of satisfaction systems, which formalizes the intuitive notion of logical systems, including syntax, semantics and the satisfaction relation. This notion was introduced in [18] under the name of "rooms", and then of "satisfaction systems" in [38]. See also [26]. Then, we propose to generalize to any satisfaction system the approach developed in [22] for propositional logic and in [30] for description logics. In this abstract framework, we will also show how to define revision operators from the relaxation notion that has been introduced in description logics to define dissimilarity measures between concepts [14,15]. The main idea is to relax the set of models of the old belief until it becomes consistent with the new pieces of knowledge. This notion of relaxation, defined in an abstract way through a set of properties, turns out to generalize several revision operators introduced in different contexts e.g. [9,20,25,29]. This is another key contribution of our work.

To concretize our abstract framework, we provide examples of relaxations in propositional logics, first order logics, and Horn logic. The case of description logics (DLs) is more detailed. This is motivated, as mentioned above, by their broad scope of applications, including reasoning on large web data.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some concepts, notations and terminology about satisfaction systems which are used in this work. In Section 3, we adapt the AGM theory in the framework of satisfaction systems, and then give an abstract model-theoretic rewriting of the AGM postulates. We then show in Section 3.2 that any revision operator satisfying such postulates accomplishes an update with minimal change to the set of models of knowledge bases. In Section 3.3, we introduce a general framework of relaxation-based revision operators and show that our revision operators lead to faithful assignments and then also satisfy the AGM postulates. In Section 4, we illustrate our abstract approach by providing revision operators in different logics, including classical logics (propositional and first order logics) and non-classical ones (Horn and description logics). The case of DL is further developed in Section 4.4, with several examples. Finally, Section 5 is dedicated to related works.

## 2. Satisfaction systems

Satisfaction systems [26] generalize Tarski's classical "semantic definition of truth" [39] and Barwise's "Translation Axiom" [4]. For the sake of generalization, sentences are simply required to form a set. All other contingencies such as inductive definition of sentences are not considered. Similarly, models are simply seen as elements of a class, i.e. no particular structure is imposed on them.

### 2.1. Definition and examples

Definition 1 (Satisfaction system). A satisfaction system $\mathcal{R}=($ Sen, Mod, $\models)$ consists of

- a set Sen of sentences,
- a class Mod of models, and
- a satisfaction relation $\models \subseteq \operatorname{Mod} \times$ Sen.

Let us note that the non-logical vocabulary, so-called signature, over which sentences and models are built, is not specified in Definition $1 .{ }^{1}$ Actually, it is left implicit. Hence, as we will see in the examples developed in the paper, a satisfaction system always depends on a signature.

Example 1. The following examples of satisfaction systems are of particular importance in computer science and in the remainder of this paper.

Propositional Logic (PL) Given a set of propositional variables $\Sigma$, we can define the satisfaction system $\mathcal{R}_{\Sigma}=(\operatorname{Sen}, \operatorname{Mod}$, $\vDash$ ) where Sen is the least set of sentences finitely built over propositional variables in $\Sigma$ and Boolean connectives in $\{\neg, \vee\}$, Mod contains all the mappings $v: \Sigma \rightarrow\{0,1\}$ ( 0 and 1 are the usual truth values), and the satisfaction relation $\models$ is the usual propositional satisfaction.
Horn Logic (HCL) A Horn clause is a sentence of the form $\Gamma \Rightarrow \alpha$ where $\Gamma$ is a finite (possibly empty) conjunction of propositional variables and $\alpha$ is a propositional variable. The satisfaction system of Horn clause logic is then defined as for PL except that sentences are restricted to be conjunctions of Horn clauses.
First Order Logic (FOL) and Many-sorted First Order Logic We detail here only the many-sorted variant of FOL, FOL being a particular case. Signatures are triplets $(S, F, P)$ where $S$ is a set of sorts, and $F$ and $P$ are a set of functions and a set of predicate names, respectively, both with arities in $S^{*} \times S$ and $S^{+}$respectively ( $S^{+}$is the set of all non-empty sequences of elements in $S$ and $S^{*}=S^{+} \cup\{\epsilon\}$ where $\epsilon$ denotes the empty sequence). In the following, to indicate that a function name $f \in F$ (respectively a predicate name $p \in P$ ) has for arity ( $s_{1} \ldots s_{n}, s$ ) (respectively $s_{1} \ldots s_{n}$ ), we will note $f: s_{1} \times \ldots \times s_{n} \rightarrow s$ (resp. $p: s_{1} \times \ldots \times s_{n}$ ).

Given a signature $\Sigma=(S, F, P)$, we can define the satisfaction system $\mathcal{R}_{\Sigma}=(\operatorname{Sen}, M o d, \models)$ where:

- Sen is the least set of sentences built over atoms of the form $p\left(t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n}\right)$ where $p: s_{1} \times \ldots \times s_{n} \in P$ and $t_{i} \in T_{F}(X)_{s_{i}}$ for every $i, 1 \leq i \leq n\left(T_{F}(X)_{s}\right.$ is the term algebra of sort $s$ built over $F$ with sorted variables in a given set $X$ ) by finitely applying Boolean connectives in $\{\neg, \vee\}$ and the quantifier $\forall$.
- Mod is the class of models $\mathcal{M}$ defined by a family $\left(M_{s}\right)_{s \in S}$ of sets (one for every $s \in S$ ), each one equipped with a function $f^{\mathcal{M}}: M_{s_{1}} \times \ldots \times M_{s_{n}} \rightarrow M_{s}$ for every $f: s_{1} \times \ldots \times s_{n} \rightarrow s \in F$ and with an $n$-ary relation $p^{\mathcal{M}} \subseteq M_{s_{1}} \times \ldots \times M_{s_{n}}$ for every $p: s_{1} \times \ldots \times s_{n} \in P$.
- Finally, the satisfaction relation $\models$ is the usual first-order satisfaction.

As for PL, we can consider the logic FHCL of first-order Horn Logic whose models are those of FOL and sentences are restricted to be conjunctions of universally quantified Horn sentences (i.e. sentences of the form $\Gamma \Rightarrow \alpha$ where $\Gamma$ is a finite conjunction of atoms and $\alpha$ is an atom).
Description logic (DL) Signatures are triplets ( $N_{C}, N_{R}, I$ ) where $N_{C}, N_{R}$ and $I$ are nonempty pairwise disjoint sets where elements in $N_{C}, N_{R}$ and $I$ are called concept names, role names and individuals, respectively. Given a signature $\Sigma=\left(N_{C}, N_{R}, I\right)$, we can define the satisfaction system $\mathcal{R}_{\Sigma}=(\operatorname{Sen}, \operatorname{Mod}, \models)$ where:

- Sen contains ${ }^{2}$ all the sentences of the form $C \sqsubseteq D, x: C$ and $(x, y): r$ where $x, y \in I, r \in N_{R}$ and $C$ is a concept inductively defined from $N_{C} \cup\{T\}$ and binary and unary operators in $\left\{\Pi_{-},{ }_{-} \sqcup_{\_}\right\}$and in $\left\{{ }_{-}^{c}, \forall r r_{-}, \exists r r_{-}\right\}$, respectively.
- Mod is the class of models $\mathcal{I}$ defined by a set $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ equipped for every concept name $A \in N_{C}$ with a set $A^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, for every relation name $r \in N_{R}$ with a binary relation $r^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \times \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, and for every individual $x \in I$ with a value $x^{\mathcal{I}} \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$.
- The satisfaction relation $\models$ is then defined as:
- $\mathcal{I} \models C \sqsubseteq D$ iff $C^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq D^{\mathcal{I}}$,
- $\mathcal{I} \models x: C$ iff $x^{\mathcal{I}} \in \overline{C^{\mathcal{I}}}$,
- $\mathcal{I} \models(x, y): r$ iff $\left(x^{\mathcal{I}}, y^{\mathcal{I}}\right) \in r^{\mathcal{I}}$,
where $C^{\mathcal{I}}$ is the evaluation of $C$ in $\mathcal{I}$ inductively defined on the structure of $C$ as follows:
. if $C=A$ with $A \in N_{C}$, then $C^{\mathcal{I}}=A^{\mathcal{I}}$;
- if $C=\top$ then $C^{\mathcal{I}}=\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$;
. if $C=C^{\prime} \sqcup D^{\prime}$ (resp. $C=C^{\prime} \sqcap D^{\prime}$ ), then $C^{\mathcal{I}}=C^{\prime \mathcal{I}} \cup D^{\prime \mathcal{I}}$ (resp. $C^{\mathcal{I}}=C^{\prime \mathcal{I}} \cap D^{\prime \mathcal{I}}$ );
. if $C=C^{\prime}$, then $C^{\mathcal{I}}=\Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \backslash C^{\prime \mathcal{I}}$;
. if $C=\forall r$. $C^{\prime}$, then $C^{\mathcal{I}}=\left\{x \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid \forall y \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}},(x, y) \in r^{\mathcal{I}}\right.$ implies $\left.y \in C^{\prime \mathcal{I}}\right\}$;
. if $C=\exists r . C^{\prime}$, then $C^{\mathcal{I}}=\left\{x \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid \exists y \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}},(x, y) \in r^{\mathcal{I}}\right.$ and $\left.y \in C^{\prime} \mathcal{I}\right\}$.


### 2.2. Knowledge bases and theories

Let us now consider a fixed but arbitrary satisfaction system $\mathcal{R}=(\operatorname{Sen}, \operatorname{Mod}, \models)$ (since the signature $\Sigma$ is supposed fixed, the subscript $\Sigma$ will be omitted from now on).

[^1]Notation 1. Let $T \subseteq$ Sen be a set of sentences.

- $\operatorname{Mod}(T)$ is the sub-class of $\operatorname{Mod}$ whose elements are models of $T$, i.e. for every $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$ and every $\varphi \in T, \mathcal{M} \models \varphi$. When $T$ is restricted to a formula $\varphi$ (i.e. $T=\{\varphi\}$ ), we will denote $\operatorname{Mod}(\varphi)$, the class of model of $\{\varphi\}$, rather than $\operatorname{Mod}(\{\varphi\})$.
- $C n(T)=\{\varphi \in \operatorname{Sen} \mid \forall \mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T), \mathcal{M} \models \varphi\}$ is the set of semantic consequences of $T$.
- Let $\mathbb{M} \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}$. Let us note $\mathbb{M}^{*}=\{\varphi \in \operatorname{Sen} \mid \forall \mathcal{M} \in \mathbb{M}, \mathcal{M} \models \varphi\}$. Therefore, we have for every $T \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}, \operatorname{Cn}(T)=\operatorname{Mod}(T)^{*}$. When $\mathbb{M}$ is restricted to one model $\mathcal{M}, \mathbb{M}^{*}$ will be equivalently noted $\mathcal{M}^{*}$.
- Let us note Triv $=\left\{\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod} \mid \mathcal{M}^{*}=\operatorname{Sen}\right\}$, i.e. the set of models in which all formulas are satisfied. In PL and FOL, Triv is empty because the negation is considered. Similarly, the complementation is involved in the DL $\mathcal{A L C}$, hence Triv is empty. In HCL, Triv only contains the unique model where all propositional variables have a truth value equal to 1 . In FHCL, Triv contains all models $\mathcal{M}$ where for every predicate name $p: s_{1} \times \ldots \times s_{n} \in P, p^{\mathcal{M}}=M_{s_{1}} \times \ldots \times M_{s_{n}}$.

Let us note that for every $T \subseteq$ Sen, $\operatorname{Triv} \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}(T)$.
From the above notations, we obviously have:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\operatorname{Cn}(T)=C n\left(T^{\prime}\right) \Leftrightarrow \operatorname{Mod}(T)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

The two functions $\operatorname{Mod}\left(_{-}\right)$from $\mathcal{P}(S e n)$ into $\mathcal{P}(\operatorname{Mod})$ and _* from $\mathcal{P}(\operatorname{Mod})$ into $\mathcal{P}(S e n)$ form what is known as a Galois connection in that they satisfy the following properties: for all $T, T^{\prime} \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}$ and $\mathbb{M}, \mathbb{M}^{\prime} \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}$, we have (see [13] and the proof of Proposition 1 below)
(1) $T \subseteq T^{\prime} \Longrightarrow \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}(T)$
(2) $\mathbb{M} \subseteq \mathbb{M}^{\prime} \Longrightarrow \mathbb{M}^{*} \subseteq \mathbb{M}^{*}$
(3) $T \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}(T)^{*}$
(4) $\mathbb{M} \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(\mathbb{M}^{*}\right)$

Definition 2 (Knowledge base and theory). A knowledge base $T$ is a set of sentences (i.e. $T \subseteq$ Sen). A knowledge base $T$ is said to be a theory if and only if $T=C n(T)$.

A theory $T$ is finitely representable if there exists a finite set $T^{\prime} \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}$ such that $T=\operatorname{Cn}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$.
Proposition 1. For every satisfaction system $\mathcal{R}$, we have:
Inclusion $\forall T \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}, T \subseteq C n(T)$;
Iteration $\forall T \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}, \operatorname{Cn}(T)=C n(C n(T))$;
Monotonicity $\forall T, T^{\prime} \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}, T \subseteq T^{\prime} \Longrightarrow C n(T) \subseteq C n\left(T^{\prime}\right)$.
Proof. For the sake of completeness, let us first show that Mod is decreasing (Property 1 ): let us assume $T \subseteq T^{\prime}$, then $\forall \mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$ we have $\forall \varphi \in T, \varphi \in T^{\prime}$, and thus $\mathcal{M} \models \varphi$. Hence $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$.

Let us now show that $C n$ is increasing (monotonicity property): let us assume $T \subseteq T^{\prime}$, then $\forall \varphi \in C n(T)$ we have $\forall \mathcal{M} \in$ $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right), \mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$ since $\operatorname{Mod}$ is decreasing, and $\mathcal{M} \models \varphi$. Hence $\varphi \in \operatorname{Cn}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$.

We have $T \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}(T)^{*}$ (Property 3): indeed, $\forall \varphi \in T$ we have $\forall \mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T), \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi$ by definition of $\operatorname{Mod}(T)$. Hence $\varphi \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)^{*}$.

It is then easy to see that $C n$ is extensive (inclusion property) from the previous property and $\operatorname{Cn}(T)=\operatorname{Mod}(T)^{*}$.
Let us finally show that $C n$ is idempotent (iteration property): extensivity implies $\forall T, C n(T) \subseteq C n(C n(T))$. Since $T \subseteq$ $\operatorname{Mod}(T)^{*}$ and $C n$ is increasing, we have $\operatorname{Cn}(T) \subseteq C n\left(\operatorname{Mod}(T)^{*}\right)=\operatorname{Cn}(C n(T))$.

Hence, satisfaction systems are Tarskian according to the definition of logics given by Tarski: a logic is a pair $(\mathcal{L}, C n)$ where $\mathcal{L}$ is a set of expressions (formulas) and $C n: \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{L}) \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{L})$ is a mapping that satisfies the inclusion, iteration and monotonicity properties [40]. Indeed, from any satisfaction system $\mathcal{R}$ we can define the following Tarskian logic ( $\mathcal{L}, C n$ ) where $\mathcal{L}=S e n$ and $C n$ is the mapping that associates to every $T \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}$, the set $C n(T)$ of semantic consequences of $T$.

Classically, the consistency of a theory $T$ is defined as $\operatorname{Mod}(T) \neq \emptyset$. The problem of such a definition of consistency is that its significance depends on the considered logic. Hence, this consistency is significant for FOL, while in FHCL it is a trivial property since each set of sentences is consistent because $\operatorname{Mod}(T)$ always contains Triv which is non-empty. Here, for the notion of consistency to be more appropriate for our purpose of defining revision for the largest family of logics, we propose a more general definition of consistency, the meaning of which is that there is at least a sentence which is not a semantic consequence.

Definition 3 (Consistency). $T \subseteq$ Sen is consistent if $\operatorname{Cn}(T) \neq$ Sen.

Proposition 2. For every $T \subseteq$ Sen, $T$ is consistent if and only if $\operatorname{Mod}(T) \backslash \operatorname{Triv} \neq \emptyset$.

Proof. Let us prove that $C n(T)=$ Sen iff $\operatorname{Mod}(T) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}=\emptyset$. Let us first assume that $\operatorname{Mod}(T) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}=\emptyset$. Therefore, this means that the only models that satisfy $T$ are $\mathcal{M}$ such that $\mathcal{M}^{*}=\operatorname{Sen}$ (if they exist). Hence, we have $\operatorname{Cn}(T)=\operatorname{Mod}(T)^{*}=\operatorname{Sen}$.

Conversely, let us assume that $\operatorname{Cn}(T)=$ Sen. This means that every model $\mathcal{M}$ such that $\mathcal{M}^{*} \neq \operatorname{Sen}$ does not belong to $\operatorname{Mod}(T)$, and $\operatorname{Mod}(T) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}=\emptyset$.

Corollary 1. For every $T \subseteq$ Sen, $T$ is inconsistent is equivalent to $\operatorname{Mod}(T)=$ Triv.

## 3. AGM postulates for revision in satisfaction systems

### 3.1. AGM postulates and weakened AGM postulates

The AGM postulates for knowledge base revision in satisfaction systems are easily adaptable. We build upon the modeltheoretic characterization introduced by Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM) [22] for propositional logic. Note, however, that in propositional logic, a belief base can be represented by a formula, and then the KM postulates exploit this property. This is no longer the case in our context, but we argue that the postulates are still appropriate, except the one on syntax independence, as discussed next. Given two knowledge bases $T, T^{\prime} \subseteq S e n, T \circ T^{\prime}$ denotes the revision of $T$ by $T^{\prime}$, that is, $T \circ T^{\prime}$ is obtained by adding consistently new knowledge $T^{\prime}$ to the old knowledge base $T$. Note that $T \circ T^{\prime}$ cannot be defined as $T \cup T^{\prime}$ because nothing ensures that $T \cup T^{\prime}$ is consistent. The revision operator has then to minimally change $T$ so that $T \circ T^{\prime}$ is consistent. This is what the AGM postulates ensure.

Here we use the following weakened AGM postulates ${ }^{3}$ :
(G1) If $T^{\prime}$ is consistent, then so is $T \circ T^{\prime}$.
(G2) $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$.
(G3) if $T \cup T^{\prime}$ is consistent, then $T \circ T^{\prime}=T \cup T^{\prime}$.
(G5) $\operatorname{Mod}\left(\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)$.
(G6) if $\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}$ is consistent, then $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)$.
In the literature such as in [22,30], an additional postulate concerns the independence of the syntax:

$$
\text { (G4) If } C n\left(T_{1}\right)=C n\left(T_{1}^{\prime}\right) \text { and } C n\left(T_{2}\right)=C n\left(T_{2}^{\prime}\right) \text {, then } \operatorname{Mod}\left(T_{1} \circ T_{2}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(T_{1}^{\prime} \circ T_{2}^{\prime}\right) \text {. }
$$

This postulate states a complete independence of the syntactical forms of both the original knowledge base and the newly acquired knowledge. The problem with Postulate (G4) is that it is almost never satisfied when we want to preserve the structure of knowledge bases and then apply revision operators over the formulas that compose knowledge bases. Indeed, let us consider in the logic PL the following knowledge bases $T_{1}=\{p, q\}$ and $T_{2}=\{q \Rightarrow p, q\}$ over the signature $\{p, q\}$. Obviously, we have that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T_{1}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(T_{2}\right)=\{v: p \mapsto 1, q \mapsto 1\}$. Let us consider the knowledge base $T^{\prime}=\{\neg q\}$. We have now that $T_{1} \cup T^{\prime}$ (and then $T_{2} \cup T^{\prime}$ ) is inconsistent. A way to retrieve the consistency is to replace in $T_{1}$ and $T_{2}$ the atomic formula $q$ by $\neg q$. Hence, $T_{1} \circ T^{\prime}=\{p, \neg q\}$ and $T_{2} \circ T^{\prime}=\{q \Rightarrow p, \neg q\}$. Then $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T_{1} \circ T^{\prime}\right)=\{v: p \mapsto 1, q \mapsto 0\}$, $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T_{2} \circ T^{\prime}\right)=\left\{v: p \mapsto 1, q \mapsto 0 ; \nu^{\prime}: p \mapsto 0, q \mapsto 0\right\}$, and $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T_{1} \circ T^{\prime}\right) \neq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T_{2} \circ T^{\prime}\right)$. This example shows that syntax independence may be too strong a requirement.

In [22], the authors bypass the problem by representing any knowledge base $K$ (which is a theory in [22]) by a propositional formula $\psi$ such that $K=\operatorname{Cn}(\psi)$. Hence, they apply their revision operator on $\psi$ and not on $K$, and so they lose the structure of the knowledge base $K$.

A weaker form of this postulate could be written as:
(G'4) If $\operatorname{Cn}\left(T_{1}^{\prime}\right)=C n\left(T_{2}^{\prime}\right)$, then $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T_{1}^{\prime}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T_{2}^{\prime}\right)$,
which ensures a partial independence of the syntax, only on the new knowledge. Remarkably, this weaker form can be derived from the other postulates (as expressed in Proposition 3), and is hence not used in the subsequent proofs (see e.g. Theorem 1 below).

Proposition 3. Postulates (G1)-(G3), (G5) and (G6) imply Postulate (G'4).
Proof. See Appendix.
Based on this result, the only weakened AGM postulates (G1)-(G3), (G5) and (G6) are considered next.

[^2]
### 3.2. Faithful assignment and weakened AGM postulates

Intuitively, any revision operator o satisfying the weakened AGM postulates above induces minimal change, that is the models of $T \circ T^{\prime}$ are the models of $T$ that are the closest to models of $T^{\prime}$, according to some distance for measuring how close are models. This is what is now shown in this section by establishing a correspondence between the weakened AGM postulates and binary relations over models with minimality conditions.

Let $\mathbb{M} \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}$ and $\preceq$ be a binary relation over $\mathbb{M}$. We define $\prec$ as $\mathcal{M} \prec \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ if and only if $\mathcal{M} \preceq \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ and $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \npreceq \mathcal{M}$. We also define $\operatorname{Min}(\mathbb{M}, \preceq)=\left\{\mathcal{M} \in \mathbb{M} \mid \forall \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \mathbb{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \nprec \mathcal{M}\right\}$.

Definition 4 (Faithful assignment). An assignment is a mapping that assigns to each knowledge base $T$ a binary relation $\preceq_{T}$ over Mod. We say that this assignment is faithful (FA) if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(1) if $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T), \mathcal{M} \not \not_{T} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$.
(2) for every $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$ and every $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod} \backslash \operatorname{Mod}(T), \mathcal{M} \prec_{T} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$.

A binary relation $\preceq_{T}$ assigned to a knowledge base $T$ by a faithful assignment will be also said faithful.

This definition of FA differs from the one originally given in [22] on two points:
(1) In [22], a third condition is stated:

$$
\forall T, T^{\prime} \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}, \operatorname{Mod}(T)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \Rightarrow \preceq_{T}=\preceq_{T^{\prime}}
$$

As for (G4), this condition expresses a syntactical independence.
(2) It is not required for $\preceq_{T}$ to be a pre-order. As shown below, the only important feature to have to make a correspondence between a FA and the fact that o satisfies the weakened AGM Postulates is that there is a minimal model for $\preceq_{T}$ in $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$ as expressed by Theorem 1.

Theorem 1. Let o be a revision operator. The operator $\circ$ satisfies the weakened AGM Postulates (as defined in Section 3.1) if and only if there exists a FA that maps each knowledge base $T \subseteq$ Sen to a binary relation $\preceq_{T}$ such that for every knowledge base $T^{\prime} \subseteq$ Sen:

- $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}=\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$;
- if $T^{\prime}$ is consistent, then $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right) \neq \emptyset$;
- for every $T^{\prime \prime} \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}$, if $\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}$ is consistent, then $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right) \cap \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime \prime}\right)=\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$.

Proof. See Appendix.
Note that if $T^{\prime}$ is inconsistent, then so is $T \circ T^{\prime}$, and we can set arbitrarily $T \circ T^{\prime}=T^{\prime}$, which corresponds to a cautious revision. The case where $T$ is inconsistent is not considered in this paper (and is usually excluded from the scope of revision procedures), since in that case other operators could be more relevant than revision, in particular debugging methods (see e.g. [36] for debugging of terminologies, or [32] for base revision for ontology debugging, both in description logics).

Given a revision operator o satisfying the weakened AGM postulates, any FA satisfying the supplementary conditions of Theorem 1 will be called FA+. To a revision operator o satisfying the weakened AGM postulates, we can associate many FA+. An example of such a FA+ was given in the proof of Theorem 1 . Another example is the mapping $f$ that associates to every $T \subseteq$ Sen the binary relation $\preceq_{T}$ defined as follows:

Given $T^{\prime} \subseteq$ Sen, let us start by defining $\leq_{T}^{T^{\prime}} \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \times \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$ as:

$$
\mathcal{M} \preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime}} \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \text { and } \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \notin \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)
$$

Let us then set $f(T)=\preceq_{T}=\bigcup_{T^{\prime}} \preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime}}$ (i.e. $\mathcal{M} \preceq_{T} \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \Leftrightarrow \exists T^{\prime}, \mathcal{M} \preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime}} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ ).
Theorem 2. If $\circ$ satisfies the weakened AGM postulates, then the mapping $f$ defined above is a FA+.

Proof. See Appendix.

Actually, the set of FA+ associated with a revision operator satisfying the weakened AGM postulates has a lattice structure, as shown by the following definition and propositions.

Definition 5. Let $f_{1}, f_{2}$ be two FA. Let us denote $f_{1} \sqcup f_{2}$ (resp. $f_{1} \sqcap f_{2}$ ) the mapping that assigns to each knowledge base $T \subseteq$ Sen the binary relation $\preceq_{T}=\preceq_{T}^{1} \cup \preceq_{T}^{2}$ (resp. $\preceq_{T}=\preceq_{T}^{1} \cap \preceq_{T}^{2}$ ) where $f_{i}(T)=\preceq_{T}^{i}$ for $i=1$, 2.

Proposition 4. If $f_{1}$ and $f_{2}$ are FA+ for a same revision operator $\circ$, then so are $f_{1} \sqcup f_{2}$ and $f_{1} \sqcap f_{2}$.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5. The relation $\leq$ defined on $F A+$ by:

$$
f \leq g \Longleftrightarrow \forall T \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}, f(T) \subseteq g(T)
$$

is a partial ordering.
Given a revision operator $\circ$ which satisfies the weakened $A G M$ postulates, the poset $(F A+(\circ), \leq)$ of $F A+$ associated with $\circ$ is a lattice. For any $f, g \in F A+(\circ), f \sqcup g$ (respectively $f \sqcap g$ ) is the least upper bound (respectively the greatest lower bound) of $\{f, g\}$. The lattice $(F A+(\circ), \leq)$ is further complete.

Proof. The fact that the relation $\leq$ actually defines a partial order is straightforward. The fact that $f \sqcup g$ and $f \sqcap g$ are the least upper bound and greatest lower bound of $\{f, g\}$ is also easy to show.

Given a subset $S \subseteq \mathrm{FA}+(\circ)$, its least upper bound is the mapping $\sqcup S: T \mapsto \bigcup_{f \in S} f(T)$, and its greatest lower bound is the mapping $\sqcap S: T \mapsto \bigcap_{f \in S} f(T)$. By extending the proof of Proposition 4, it is easy to show that $\sqcup S$ and $\sqcap S$ are FA+.

### 3.3. Relaxation and AGM postulates

Relaxations have been introduced in [14,15] in the framework of description logics with the aim of defining dissimilarity between concepts. Here, we propose to generalize this notion in the framework of satisfaction systems.

Definition 6 (Relaxation). A relaxation is a mapping $\rho:$ Sen $\rightarrow$ Sen satisfying the following properties:
Extensivity $\forall \varphi \in \operatorname{Sen}, \operatorname{Mod}(\varphi) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}(\rho(\varphi))$.
Exhaustivity $\exists k \in \mathbb{N}, \operatorname{Mod}\left(\rho^{k}(\varphi)\right)=\operatorname{Mod}$, where $\rho^{0}$ is the identity mapping, and for all $k>0, \rho^{k}(\varphi)=\rho\left(\rho^{k-1}(\varphi)\right)$.
Let us observe that relaxations exist if and only if the underlying satisfaction system (Sen, Mod, $\models$ ) has tautologies (i.e. formulas $\varphi \in \operatorname{Sen}$ such that $\operatorname{Mod}(\varphi)=\operatorname{Mod})$. Indeed, when the satisfaction system has tautologies, we can define the trivial relaxation $\rho: \varphi \mapsto \psi$ where $\psi$ is any tautology. ${ }^{4}$ Conversely, all relaxations imply that the underlying satisfaction system has tautologies to satisfy the exhaustivity condition.

The interest of relaxations is that they give rise to revision operators which have demonstrated their usefulness in practice (see Section 4).

Notation 2. Let $T \subseteq$ Sen be a knowledge base. Let $\mathcal{K}=\left\{k_{\varphi} \in \mathbb{N} \mid \varphi \in T\right\}$, and $\mathcal{K}^{\prime}=\left\{k_{\varphi}^{\prime} \in \mathbb{N} \mid \varphi \in T\right\}$. Let us note:

- $\rho^{\mathcal{K}}(T)=\left\{\rho^{k_{\varphi}}(\varphi) \mid k_{\varphi} \in \mathcal{K}, \varphi \in T\right\}$,
- $\sum \mathcal{K}=\sum_{k_{\varphi} \in \mathcal{K}} k_{\varphi}$,
- $\mathcal{K} \leq \mathcal{K}^{\prime}$ when for every $\varphi \in T, k_{\varphi} \leq k_{\varphi}^{\prime}$,
- $\mathcal{K}<\mathcal{K}^{\prime}$ if $\mathcal{K} \leq \mathcal{K}^{\prime}$ and $\exists \varphi \in T, k_{\varphi}<k_{\varphi}^{\prime}$.

In this notation, $k_{\varphi}$ is a number associated with each formula $\varphi$ of the knowledge base (equivalently it can be considered as a function of $\varphi$ taking values in $\mathbb{N}$ ), which intuitively represents the degree to which $\varphi$ is relaxed.

Definition 7 (Revision based on relaxation). Let $\rho$ be a relaxation. A revision operator over $\rho$ is a mapping $\circ: \mathcal{P}($ Sen $) \times$ $\mathcal{P}($ Sen $) \rightarrow \mathcal{P}($ Sen $)$ satisfying for every $T, T^{\prime} \subseteq$ Sen:

$$
T \circ T^{\prime}= \begin{cases}\rho^{\mathcal{K}}(T) \cup T^{\prime} & \text { if } T^{\prime} \text { is consistent } \\ T^{\prime} & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

for some $\mathcal{K}=\left\{k_{\varphi} \in \mathbb{N} \mid \varphi \in T\right\}$ such that:
(1) if $T^{\prime}$ is consistent, then $T \circ T^{\prime}$ is consistent;
(2) for every $\mathcal{K}^{\prime}$ such that $\rho^{\mathcal{K}^{\prime}}(T) \cup T^{\prime}$ is consistent, $\sum \mathcal{K} \leq \sum \mathcal{K}^{\prime}$ (minimality on the number of applications of the relaxation);
(3) for every $T^{\prime \prime}$ such that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime \prime}\right)$, if $T \circ T^{\prime \prime}=\rho^{\mathcal{K}}(T) \cup T^{\prime \prime}$, then $\mathcal{K}^{\prime} \leq \mathcal{K}$.

[^3]

Fig. 1. Successive relaxations of $T$ until it becomes consistent with $T^{\prime}$.

Revision based on relaxation is illustrated in Fig. 1 where theories are represented as sets of their models. Intermediate steps to define the revision operators are then the definitions of formula and theory relaxations.

It is important to note that given a relaxation $\rho$, several revision operators can be defined. Without Condition 3 of Definition 7, we could accept revision operators o that do not satisfy Postulates (G5) and (G6). Hence, Condition 3 allows us to exclude such operators. To illustrate this, let us consider in FOL the satisfaction system $\mathcal{R}=(\operatorname{Sen}, \mathrm{Mod}, \models)$ over the signature $(S, F, P)$ where $S=\{s\}, F=\emptyset$ and $P=\{=: s \times s\}$. Let us consider $T, T^{\prime} \subseteq$ Sen such that:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& T=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\exists x \cdot \exists y \cdot(\neg x=y) \wedge \forall z(z=x \vee z=y) \\
\exists x \cdot \exists y \cdot \exists z \cdot(\neg x=y \wedge \neg y=z \wedge \neg x=z) \wedge \\
\forall w(w=x \vee w=y \vee w=z)
\end{array}\right\} \\
& T^{\prime}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\forall x \cdot x=x \\
\forall x \cdot \forall y \cdot x=y \Rightarrow y=x \\
\forall x \cdot \forall y \cdot \forall z \cdot x=y \wedge y=z \Rightarrow x=z
\end{array}\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Obviously, $T^{\prime}$ is consistent. As $T$ does not contain the axioms for equality, it is also consistent. Indeed, the model $\mathcal{M}$ with its associated set $M_{s}=\{0,1,2\}$ and the binary relation $={ }^{\mathcal{M}} \subseteq M_{S} \times M_{S}$, defined by the following set $\{(0,0),(1,1),(2,0)\}$, satisfies $T$.

But $T \cup T^{\prime}$ is not consistent. The reason is that when the meaning of $=$ is the equality, the first axiom of $T$ can only be satisfied by models with two values while the second axiom is satisfied by models with three values. A way to retrieve the consistency is to remove one of the two axioms. This can be modeled by the relaxation $\rho$ that maps each formula to a tautology. ${ }^{5}$ But in this case, we have then two options depending on whether we remove and change the first or the second axiom by a tautology, which give rise to two revision operators $\circ_{1}$ and $\circ_{2}$. The first two conditions of Definition 7 are satisfied by both $\circ_{1}$ and $\circ_{2}$.

Now, let us take $T^{\prime \prime}=\{\exists x . \exists y . \neg x=y\}$ which is satisfied, when added to the axioms in $T^{\prime}$, by any model with at least two elements. Hence, $\left(T \circ_{1} T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}$ and $\left(T \circ_{2} T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}$ are consistent. Without the third condition, nothing would prevent to define $T \circ_{1}\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)$ (respectively $T \circ_{2}\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)$ ) by removing and change in $T$ the second (respectively the first) axiom by a tautology which would be a counter-example to Postulates (G5) and (G6). Actually, as shown by the result below, this third condition of Definition 7 entails Postulates (G5) and (G6), and then, by Proposition 3, entails Postulate (G'4).

However in some situations Condition 3 may be considered as too strong, forcing to relax more than what would be needed to satisfy only Condition 2 . This could typically be the case when Condition 2 could be obtained in two different ways, for instance for $\mathcal{K}^{\prime}=\{0,1,0,0 \ldots\}$ or for $\mathcal{K}^{\prime \prime}=\{1,0,0,0 \ldots\}$. Then taking $C n\left(T^{\prime}\right)=C n\left(T^{\prime \prime}\right)$, and revising $T \circ T^{\prime}$ using $\mathcal{K}^{\prime}$ and $T \circ T^{\prime \prime}$ using $\mathcal{K}^{\prime \prime}$ would not meet Condition 3 . To satisfy it, relaxation should be done for instance with $\mathcal{K}=\{1,1,0,0 \ldots\}$. Therefore in concrete applications, we will have to find a compromise between Condition 3 and (G5)-(G6) at the price of potential larger relaxations on the one hand, and less relaxation but potentially the loss of (G5)-(G6) on the other hand.

Notation 3. In the context of Definition 7, let $T, T^{\prime} \subseteq$ Sen be two knowledge bases. If $T \circ T^{\prime}=\rho^{\mathcal{K}}(T) \cup T^{\prime}$ with $\mathcal{K}=\left\{k_{\varphi} \in\right.$ $\mathbb{N} \mid \varphi \in T\}$, then we note $\mathcal{K}_{T}^{T^{\prime}}=\mathcal{K}$.

Theorem 3. Any revision operator $\circ$ based on a relaxation (Definition 7) satisfies the weakened AGM postulates.

Proof. See Appendix.

So far we showed that several FA+ can be associated with a given revision operator o satisfying the weakened AGM postulates. Here, we define a particular one, which is more specific to revision operators based on relaxation. Let $\rho$ be a relaxation and $f_{\rho}$ be the mapping that associates to every $T \subseteq$ Sen the binary relation $\preceq_{T}$ defined as follows:

[^4]Given $T^{\prime} \subseteq$ Sen, let us start by defining $\preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime}} \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \times \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$ as:

$$
\mathcal{M} \preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime}} \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \Longleftrightarrow \forall \mathcal{K}^{\prime \prime} \geq \mathcal{K}_{T}^{T^{\prime}}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(\rho^{\mathcal{K}^{\prime \prime}}(T)\right) \Rightarrow \exists \mathcal{K}^{\prime} \geq \mathcal{K}_{T}^{T^{\prime}},\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\mathcal{K}^{\prime}<\mathcal{K}^{\prime \prime} \text { and } \\
\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(\rho^{\mathcal{K}^{\prime}}(T)\right)
\end{array}\right.
$$

Let us then set $\preceq_{T}=\bigcup_{T^{\prime}} \preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime}}$ (i.e. $\mathcal{M} \preceq_{T} \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \Leftrightarrow \exists T^{\prime}, \mathcal{M} \preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime}} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ ). We have $\preceq_{T} \subseteq \operatorname{Mod} \times \operatorname{Mod}$ because $\preceq_{T}^{\emptyset} \subseteq \preceq_{T}$. Intuitively, it means that $T$ has to be relaxed more to be satisfied by $\mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ than to be satisfied by $\mathcal{M}$.

Theorem 4. For any revision operator o based on a relaxation $\rho$ as defined in Definition 7, the mapping $f_{\rho}$ is a FA+.

Proof. See Appendix.

## 4. Applications

In this section, we illustrate our general approach by defining revision operators based on relaxations for the logics PL, HCL, and FOL. We further develop the case of DLs in Section 4.4, by defining several concrete relaxation operators for different fragments of the DL $\mathcal{A L C}$.

### 4.1. Revision in PL

Here, inspired by the work in $[7,8]$ on Morpho-Logics, we define relaxations based on dilations from mathematical morphology [6]. In PL, knowing a formula is equivalent to knowing the set of its models, and we can identify any propositional formula $\varphi$ with the set of its interpretations $\operatorname{Mod}(\varphi)$. To define relaxations in PL, we will apply set-theoretic morphological operations. First, let us recall a basic definition of dilation in mathematical morphology [6]. Let $X$ and $B$ be two subsets of $\mathbb{R}^{n}$. The dilation of $X$ by the structuring element $B$, denoted by $D_{B}(X)$, is defined as follows:

$$
D_{B}(X)=\left\{x \in \mathbb{R}^{n} \mid B_{x} \cap X \neq \emptyset\right\}
$$

where $B_{\chi}$ denotes the translation of $B$ at $x$. More generally, dilations in any space can be defined in a similar way by considering the structuring element as a binary relationship between elements of this space. ${ }^{6}$

In PL, this leads to the following dilation of a formula $\varphi \in S e n$ :

$$
\operatorname{Mod}\left(D_{B}(\varphi)\right)=\left\{v \in \operatorname{Mod} \mid B_{v} \cap \operatorname{Mod}(\varphi) \neq \emptyset\right\}
$$

where $B_{v}$ contains all the models that satisfy some relationship with $v$. The relationship standardly used is based on a discrete distance $\delta$ between models, and the most commonly used is the Hamming distance $d_{H}$ where $d_{H}\left(v, v^{\prime}\right)$ for two propositional models over a same signature is the number of propositional symbols that are instantiated differently in $v$ and $v^{\prime}$. From any distance $\delta$ between models, a distance from models to a formula is derived as follows: $d(v, \varphi)=$ $\min _{\nu^{\prime} \models \varphi} \delta\left(\nu, \nu^{\prime}\right)$. In this case, we can rewrite the dilation of a formula as follows:

$$
\operatorname{Mod}\left(D_{B}(\varphi)\right)=\{\nu \in \operatorname{Mod}(\Sigma) \mid d(v, \varphi) \leq 1\}
$$

This consists in using the distance ball of radius 1 as structuring element $B$. To ensure the exhaustivity condition to our relaxation, we need to add a condition on distances, the betweenness property [14].

Definition 8 (Betweenness property). Let $\delta$ be a discrete distance over a set $S . \delta$ has the betweenness property if for all $x, y$ in $S$ and all $k$ in $\{0,1, \ldots, \delta(x, y)\}$, there exists $z$ in $S$ such that $\delta(x, z)=k$ and $\delta(z, y)=\delta(x, y)-k$.

The Hamming distance trivially satisfies the betweenness property. The interest for our purpose of this property is that it allows from any model to reach any other one, and then ensuring the exhaustivity property of relaxation. ${ }^{7}$

Proposition 6. Let $D_{B}$ be a dilation applied to formulas $\varphi \in$ Sen for a finite signature, and based on a distance between models that satisfies the betweenness property. Such a dilation $D_{B}$ is a relaxation.

[^5]

Fig. 2. A simple example of revision based on dilation in PL (see text). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

Proof. It is extensive. Indeed, for every $\varphi$ and for every $\operatorname{model} v \in \operatorname{Mod}(\varphi)$, we have that $d(\nu, \varphi)=0$, and then $\varphi \models D_{B}(\varphi)$. Exhaustivity results from the fact that the considered signature is a finite set and from the betweenness property.

Using Definition 7, this relaxation allows defining revision operators that include the classical Dalal's revision as a particular case (see [7,8]).

A simple example is illustrated in Fig. 2. Three propositional symbols $a, b$ and $c$ are considered. The set of models is represented by the vertices of a cube, and we assimilate a formula formed by a simple conjunction of symbols with its corresponding model. For instance $a \wedge b \wedge c$ is assimilated to the corresponding world, represented by the point $(1,1,1)$ in the cube. The edges link two worlds differing by one instantiation of a propositional symbol, i.e. at a distance 1 for the Hamming distance. For instance vertices representing $a \wedge b \wedge c$ and $\neg a \wedge b \wedge c$ are linked by an edge (we have $d_{H}(a \wedge b \wedge$ $c, \neg a \wedge b \wedge c)=1$ ). Colored dots define $\varphi$ and $\psi: \varphi=a \wedge b \wedge c$ and $\psi=\neg c$. The red circle represents the result of the revision $\varphi \circ \psi=a \wedge b \wedge \neg c$. Indeed, $\varphi$ and $\psi$ are inconsistent, hence we relax $\varphi$ by a dilation of size 1 according to the Hamming distance, leading to $D_{B}(\varphi)=(a \wedge b \wedge c) \vee(\neg a \wedge b \wedge c) \vee(a \wedge \neg b \wedge c) \vee(a \wedge b \wedge \neg c)$, which is now consistent with $\varphi$ and the conjunction provides the revision. The result here simply amounts to change the old belief which included $c$, by negating this atom according to the new knowledge expressed by $\psi$.

### 4.2. Revision in HCL

Many works have focused on belief revision involving propositional Horn formulas (cf. [12] to have an overview on these works). Here, we propose to extend relaxations that we have defined in the framework of PL to deal with the Horn fragment of propositional theories.

Definition 9 (Model intersection). Given a propositional signature $\Sigma$ and two $\Sigma$-models $\nu, \nu^{\prime}: \Sigma \rightarrow\{0,1\}$, we note $\nu \cap \nu^{\prime}$ : $\Sigma \rightarrow\{0,1\}$ the $\Sigma$-model defined by:

$$
p \mapsto \begin{cases}1 & \text { if } v(p)=v^{\prime}(p)=1 \\ 0 & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

Given a set of $\Sigma$-models $\mathcal{S}$, we note

$$
c l_{\cap}(\mathcal{S})=\mathcal{S} \cup\left\{v \cap v^{\prime} \mid v, v^{\prime} \in \mathcal{S}\right\}
$$

$c l_{\cap}(\mathcal{S})$ is then the closure of $\mathcal{S}$ under intersection of positive atoms.
For any set $\mathcal{S}$ closed under intersection of positive atoms, there exists a Horn sentence $\varphi$ that defines $\mathcal{S}$ (i.e. $\operatorname{Mod}(\varphi)=$ $\mathcal{S}$ ). Given a distance $\delta$ between models, we then define a relaxation $\rho$ as follows: for every Horn formula $\varphi, \rho(\varphi)$ is any Horn formula $\varphi^{\prime}$ such that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(\varphi^{\prime}\right)=c l_{\cap}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(D_{B}(\varphi)\right)\right.$ (by the previous property, we know that such a formula $\varphi^{\prime}$ exists).

Proposition 7. With the same conditions as in Proposition 6, the mapping $\rho$ is a relaxation.
Then a revision operator can be defined from $\rho$ according to Definition 7.

### 4.3. Revision in FOL

A trivial way to define a relaxation in FOL is to map any formula to a tautology. A less trivial and more interesting relaxation is to change universal quantifiers to existential ones. Indeed, given a formula $\varphi$ of the form $\forall x . \psi$, if $\varphi$ is not consistent with a given theory $T, \exists x . \psi$ may be consistent with $T$ (it is quite intuitive that if it cannot be consistent for all values, it can be for some of them). A similar approach has been adopted for defining merging operators using dilations


Fig. 3. From concept relaxation and retraction to revision operators in DL.
in FOL in [20]. In the following we suppose that given a signature, every formula $\varphi$ in Sen is a disjunction of formulas in prenex form (i.e. $\varphi$ is of the form $\bigvee_{j} Q_{1}^{j} x_{1}^{j} \ldots Q_{n_{j}}^{j} x_{n_{j}}^{j} \cdot \psi_{j}$ where each $Q_{i}^{j}$ is in $\{\forall, \exists\}$ ). Let us define the relaxation $\rho$ as follows, for a tautology $\tau$ :

- $\rho(\tau)=\tau$;
- $\rho\left(\exists_{1} x_{1} \ldots \exists_{n} x_{n} \cdot \varphi\right)=\tau$;
- Let $\varphi=Q_{1} x_{1} \ldots Q_{n} x_{n} . \psi$ be a formula such that the set $E_{\varphi}=\left\{i, 1 \leq i \leq n \mid Q_{i}=\forall\right\} \neq \emptyset$. Then, $\rho\left(Q_{1} x_{1} \ldots Q_{n} x_{n} \cdot \varphi\right)=$ $\bigvee_{i \in E_{\varphi}} \varphi_{i}$ where $\varphi_{i}=Q_{1}^{\prime} x_{1} \ldots Q_{n}^{\prime} x_{n} \cdot \psi$ such that for every $j \neq i, 1 \leq j \leq n, Q_{j}^{\prime}=Q_{j}$ and $Q_{i}^{\prime}=\exists$;
- $\rho\left(\bigvee_{j} Q_{1}^{j} x_{1}^{j} \ldots Q_{n_{j}}^{j} x_{n_{j}}^{j} \cdot \psi\right)=\bigvee_{j} \rho\left(Q_{1}^{j} x_{1}^{j} \ldots Q_{n_{j}}^{j} x_{n_{j}}^{j} \cdot \psi\right)$.

Proposition 8. $\rho$ is a relaxation.
Proof. It is obviously extensive, and exhaustivity results from the fact that in a finite number of steps, we always reach the tautology $\tau$.

Again a revision operator can then be defined from $\rho$ using Definition 7.

### 4.4. Revision in $D L$

### 4.4.1. General construction scheme

The instantiation of our abstract framework to DLs follows the scheme depicted in Fig. 3.
The necessary ingredient is the specialization of formulas relaxations as abstractly defined in Definition 6. To this end, we propose to define a formula relaxation in two ways (other definitions may also exist). For sentences of the form $C \sqsubseteq D$, the first proposed approach consists in relaxing the set of interpretations of $D$, while the second one amounts to "retracting" the set of interpretations of $C$. We give hereafter formal definitions of these notions of concept relaxation and retraction.

Definition 10 (Concept relaxation). Given a signature ( $N_{C}, N_{R}, I$ ), we note C the set of concepts over this signature. A concept relaxation is an operator $\rho: \mathrm{C} \rightarrow \mathrm{C}$ that satisfies, in every model, the following properties for all C in C :
(1) $\rho$ is extensive, i.e. $C \sqsubseteq \rho(C)$
(2) $\rho$ is exhaustive, i.e. $\exists k \in \mathbb{N}, T \sqsubseteq \rho^{k}(C)$

A similar notion of concept relaxation has first been introduced in $[14,15]$ but with an additional constraint of nondecreasingness property that we do not need in this work.

A trivial concept relaxation is the operation $\rho_{\top}$ that maps every concept $C$ to $T$. Other non-trivial concrete concept relaxations will be discussed in the sequel.

Definition 11 (Concept retraction). A (concept) retraction is an operator $\kappa: \mathrm{C} \rightarrow \mathrm{C}$ that satisfies, in every model, the following properties for all $C$ in $C$ :
(1) $\kappa$ is anti-extensive, i.e. $\kappa(C) \sqsubseteq C$, and
(2) $\kappa$ is exhaustive, i.e. $\forall D \in \mathrm{C}, \exists k \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\kappa^{k}(C) \sqsubseteq D$.

Note that in this definition, $D$ could be replaced equivalently by $\perp$.
With these definitions at hand, formulas relaxation can be defined as follows, using either concept relaxation (Definition 10) or concept retraction (Definition 11). We suppose that any signature ( $N_{C}, N_{R}, I$ ) always contains in $N_{R}$ a relation name $r_{\top}$ the meaning of which is, in any model $\mathcal{O}, r_{\top}^{\mathcal{O}}=\Delta^{\mathcal{O}} \times \Delta^{\mathcal{O}}$.

Definition 12 (Formula relaxation based on concept relaxation). Let $\rho$ a concept relaxation as in Definition 10. A formula relaxation based on $\rho$, denoted $\rho_{F} \rho$ is defined as follows, for any two complex concepts $C$ and $D$, any individuals $a$, $b$, and any role $r$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
\rho_{F}^{\rho}(C \sqsubseteq D) & \equiv C \sqsubseteq \rho(D), \\
\rho_{F}^{\rho}(a: C) & \equiv a: \rho(C), \\
\left.\rho_{F}^{\rho}(\langle a, b\rangle: r)\right) & \equiv\langle a, b\rangle: r_{\top} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Note that the relaxation of the role assertion axiom amounts to delete it from the knowledge base, since a tautology is satisfied by any model.

Proposition 9. $\rho_{F}^{\rho}$ is a formula relaxation in the sense of Definition 6.
Proof. It directly follows from the extensivity and exhaustivity of $\rho$.

Definition 13 (Formula relaxation based on concept retraction). A formula relaxation based on a concept retraction $\kappa$, denoted $\rho_{F}^{\kappa}$, is defined as follows, for any two complex concepts $C$ and $D$, any individuals $a, b$, and any role $r$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
\rho_{F}^{\kappa}(C \sqsubseteq D) & \equiv \kappa(C) \sqsubseteq D, \\
\rho_{F}^{\kappa}(a: C) & \equiv a: \top, \\
\left.\rho_{F}^{\kappa}(\langle a, b\rangle: r)\right) & \equiv\langle a, b\rangle: r_{\top} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Similarly, the relaxation of the concept assertion amounts to delete it from the knowledge base.
A similar construction can be found in [29] for sentences of the form (a:C).

Proposition 10. $\rho_{F}^{\kappa}$ is a formula relaxation in the sense of Definition 6.
Proof. Extensivity and exhaustivity follow directly from the properties of $\kappa$.

To complete the picture, it remains to define concrete concept relaxation and retraction operators for particular Description Logics families. We consider the logic $\mathcal{A L C}$, as defined in Section 2.1, and its fragments $\mathcal{E L}$ and $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L U}$. $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$-concept description constructors are existential restriction $(\exists)$, conjunction ( $\square$ ), $T$ and $\perp$, while $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L U}$-concept constructors are those of $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$ enriched with disjunction (ப).

### 4.4.2. Relaxation and retraction in $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$

$\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$-concept retractions. A trivial concept retraction is the operator $\kappa_{\perp}$ that maps every concept to $\perp$. Note that this operator is also particularly interesting for debugging ontologies expressed in $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$ [37]. Let us illustrate this operator for revision through the following example adapted from [29] to restrict the language to $\mathcal{E L}$.

Example 2. Let $T=\{$ Tweety $\sqsubseteq$ bird, BIRD $\sqsubseteq$ FLIES $\}$ and $T^{\prime}=\{$ Tweety $\sqcap$ FLIES $\sqsubseteq \perp\}$. Clearly $T \cup T^{\prime}$ is inconsistent. The formula relaxation based on the retraction $\kappa_{\perp}$ amounts to apply $\kappa_{\perp}$ to the concept Tweety resulting in the following new knowledge base $\{\perp \sqsubseteq$ BIRD, BIRD $\sqsubseteq$ FLIES $\}$ which is now consistent with $T^{\prime}$. An alternative solution is to retract the concept BIRD in BIRD $\sqsubseteq$ FLIES which results in the following knowledge base \{Tweety $\sqsubseteq$ BIRD, $\perp \sqsubseteq$ FLIES\} which is also consistent with $T^{\prime}$. The sets of minimal sum $\mathcal{K}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{K}_{2}$ in Condition 2 of Definition 7 are $\mathcal{K}_{1}=\{1$, 0$\}$, (i.e. $k_{\varphi_{1}}=1, k_{\varphi_{2}}=0$, where $\varphi_{1}=$ Tweety $\sqsubseteq \operatorname{bird}, \varphi_{2}=$ BIRD $\sqsubseteq$ FLIEs $)$ and $\mathcal{K}_{2}=\{0,1\}$. However, Condition 3 of the same definition is not satisfied: let us take $T^{\prime \prime}=T^{\prime}$. Then a fortiori we have $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime \prime}\right)$. We can then write $T \circ T^{\prime}=\rho^{\mathcal{K}_{1}}(T) \cup T^{\prime}$ and $T \circ T^{\prime \prime}=\rho^{\mathcal{K}_{2}}(T) \cup T^{\prime \prime}=$ $\rho^{\mathcal{K}_{2}}(T) \cup T^{\prime}$. But we do not have any ordering relation between $\mathcal{K}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{K}_{2}$. To ensure Condition 3 , we must relax one more time the axioms in $T$ leading to the following knowledge base $\{\perp \sqsubseteq$ bird, $\perp \sqsubseteq$ flies $\}$ (for $\mathcal{K}=\{1,1\}$ ). The final revision then writes $T \circ T^{\prime}=\{\perp \sqsubseteq$ BIRD, $\perp \sqsubseteq$ FLIES, TWEETY $\sqcap$ FLIES $\sqsubseteq \perp$. This revision satisfies the weakened AGM postulates but may appear too strong, and one may prefer one of the following solutions: $T \circ_{1} T^{\prime}=\{\perp \sqsubseteq$ BIRD, BIRD $\sqsubseteq$ FLIES, TWEETY $\sqcap$ FLIES $\sqsubseteq \perp\}$ or $T \circ_{2} T^{\prime}=\{$ TWEETY $\sqsubseteq$ BIRD, $\perp \sqsubseteq$ FLIES, TWEETY $\sqcap$ FLIES $\sqsubseteq \perp\}$ at the price of loosing (G5)-(G6).

Although the results are rather intuitive, one should note that it is pretty hard to figure out what each DL researcher would like to have as a result in such an example, and this enforces the interest of relying on an established theory such as AGM or its extension. In our work we propose operators enjoying a set of properties stemming from our adaptation of the AGM theory. Some of them can meet the requirement of a knowledge engineer, and some other may not completely, depending on the context, the ontology, etc.
$\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$-concept relaxations. Dually, a trivial relaxation is the operator $\rho_{\top}$ that maps every concept to $\top$. Other non-trivial $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$-concept description relaxations have been introduced in [14]. We summarize here some of these operators.
$\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$ concept descriptions can appropriately be represented as labeled trees, often called $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$ description trees [3]. An $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$ description tree is a tree whose nodes are labeled with sets of concept names and whose edges are labeled with role names. An $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$ concept description

$$
\begin{equation*}
C \equiv P_{1} \sqcap \cdots \sqcap P_{n} \sqcap \exists r_{1} \cdot C_{1} \sqcap \cdots \sqcap \exists r_{m} . C_{m}, \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

with $P_{i} \in N_{C} \cup\{T\}$, can be translated into a description tree by labeling the root node $v_{0}$ with $\left\{P_{1}, \ldots, P_{n}\right\}$, creating an $r_{j}$ successor, and then proceeding inductively by expanding $C_{j}$ for the $r_{j}$-successor node for all $j \in\{1, \ldots, m\}$.

An $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$-concept description relaxation then amounts to apply simple tree operations. Two relaxations can hence be defined [14]: (i) $\rho_{\text {depth }}$ that reduces the role depth of each concept by 1 , simply by pruning the description tree, and (ii) $\rho_{\text {leaves }}$ that removes all leaves from a description tree.

### 4.4.3. Relaxations in $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L U}$

The relaxation defined above exploits the strong property that an $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$ concept description is isomorphic to a description tree. This is arguably not true for more expressive DLs. Let us try to go one step further in expressivity and consider the logic $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$. Here we only propose some definitions of relaxations. Retractions could be designed similarly. A relaxation operator, as introduced in [14], requires a concept description to be in a special normal form, called normal form with grouping of existentials, defined recursively as follows.

Definition 14 (Normal form with grouping of existential restrictions). We say that an $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$-concept $D$ is written in normal form with grouping of existential restrictions if it is of the form

$$
\begin{equation*}
D=\bigcap_{A \in N_{D}} A \sqcap \prod_{r \in N_{R}} D_{r}, \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $N_{D} \subseteq N_{C}$ is a set of concept names and the concepts $D_{r}$ are of the form

$$
\begin{equation*}
D_{r}=\prod_{E \in \mathcal{C}_{D_{r}}} \exists r . E \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

where no subsumption relation holds between two distinct conjuncts and $\mathcal{C}_{D_{r}}$ is a set of complex $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$-concepts that are themselves in normal form with grouping of existential restrictions.

The purpose of $D_{r}$ terms is simply to group existential restrictions that share the same role name. For an $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L U}$-concept $C$ we say that $C$ is in normal form if it is of the form ( $C \equiv C_{1} \sqcup C_{2} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup C_{k}$ ) and each of the $C_{i}$ is an $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$-concept in normal form with grouping of existential restrictions.

Definition 15 (Relaxation from normal form [14]). Given an $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L U}$-concept description $C$ we define an operator $\rho_{e}$ recursively as follows.

- For $C=T$ we define $\rho_{e}(C)=T$.
- For $C=D_{r}$, where $D_{r}$ is a group of existential restrictions as in Equation (4), we need to distinguish two cases:
. if $D_{r} \equiv \exists r$. $\top$ we define $\rho_{e}\left(D_{r}\right)=\top$, and
. if $D_{r} \not \equiv \exists r$. $\top$ then we define $\rho_{e}\left(D_{r}\right)=\bigsqcup_{\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{C}_{D_{r}}}\left(\prod_{E \notin \mathcal{S}} \exists r . E \sqcap \exists r . \rho_{e}\left(\prod_{F \in \mathcal{S}} F\right)\right)$.
Note that in the latter case $\top \notin \mathcal{C}_{D_{r}}$ since $D_{r}$ is in normal form.
- For $C=D$ as in Equation (3) we define $\rho_{e}(D)=\bigsqcup_{G \in \mathcal{C}_{D}}\left(\rho_{e}(G) \sqcap \prod_{H \in \mathcal{C}_{D} \backslash\{G\}} H\right)$, where $\mathcal{C}_{D}=N_{D} \cup\left\{D_{r} \mid r \in N_{R}\right\}$.
- Finally for $C=C_{1} \sqcup C_{2} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup C_{k}$ we set $\rho_{e}(C)=\rho_{e}\left(C_{1}\right) \sqcup \rho_{e}\left(C_{2}\right) \sqcup \cdots \sqcup \rho_{e}\left(C_{k}\right)$.

Proposition 11. [14] $\rho_{e}$ is a relaxation.
Let us illustrate this operator with an example.

Example 3. Suppose an agent believes that a person Bob is married to a female judge: $T=\{$ Bob $\sqsubseteq$ male $\sqcap \exists$.MarriedTo. (FEMALE $\sqcap$ JUDGE) $\}$. Suppose now that due to some obscurantist law, it happens that females are not allowed to be judges. This new belief is captured as $T^{\prime}=\left\{J U D G E \sqcap\right.$ FEMALE $\sqsubseteq \perp$ \}. By applying $\rho_{e}$ one can resolve the conflict between the two belief sets. To ease the reading, let us rewrite the concepts as follows: $A \equiv$ male, $B \equiv$ female, $C \equiv$ judge, $m \equiv$ MarriedTo, $D \equiv$ $\exists$ MarriedTo. (Female $\sqcap$ JUdge). Hence, from Definition 15 we have $\rho_{e}(A \sqcap D) \equiv\left(\rho_{e}(A) \sqcap D\right) \sqcup\left(A \sqcap \rho_{e}(D)\right)$, with $\rho_{e}(A) \equiv \top$ and

$$
\begin{aligned}
\rho_{e}(D) & \equiv \exists m \cdot \rho_{e}(B \sqcap C) \sqcup\left(\exists m \cdot B \sqcap \exists m \cdot \rho_{e}(C)\right) \sqcup\left(\exists m \cdot \rho_{e}(B) \sqcap \exists m \cdot C\right) \\
& \equiv \exists m \cdot(B \sqcup C) \sqcup(\exists m \cdot B \sqcap \exists m \cdot \top) \sqcup(\exists m \cdot \top \sqcap \exists m \cdot C) \\
& \equiv \exists m \cdot B \sqcup \exists m \cdot C \sqcup \exists m \cdot(B \sqcup C) \equiv \exists m \cdot B \sqcup \exists m \cdot C
\end{aligned}
$$

Then

$$
\begin{aligned}
\rho_{e}(A \sqcap D) & \equiv\left(\rho_{e}(A) \sqcap D\right) \sqcup\left(A \sqcap \rho_{e}(D)\right) \\
& \equiv(\top \sqcap D) \sqcup(A \sqcap(\exists m \cdot B \sqcup \exists m \cdot C)) \\
& \equiv D \sqcup(A \sqcap(\exists m \cdot B \sqcup \exists m \cdot C))
\end{aligned}
$$

The new agent's belief, up to a rewriting, becomes
$\{$ Bob $\sqsubseteq \exists$.MARriedTo. (FEMALE $\sqcap$ JUDGE) $\sqcup($ MALE $\sqcap(\exists$ MARRIED.FEMALE $\sqcup \exists$ MARRIED.JUDGE) $)$, JUDGE $\sqcap$ FEMALE $\sqsubseteq \perp$ \}.

One can notice from this example that the relaxation $\rho_{e}$ leads to a refined revision operator. Indeed, the resulting relaxed axiom in $T$ emphasizes all the minimal possible changes (through the disjunction operator) on Bob's condition. This is due to the fact that the relaxation operator $\rho_{e}$ corresponds to dilating the set of models of a ball defined from an edit distance on the concept description tree of size one. For more details on the correspondence between this relaxation operator, the set of models and tree edit distances, one can refer to [14].

Another possibility for defining a relaxation in $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L U}$ is obtained by exploiting the disjunction constructor by augmenting a concept description with a set of exceptions.

Definition 16 (Relaxation from exceptions in $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L U}$ ). Given a set of exceptions $\mathcal{E}=\left\{E_{1}, \cdots, E_{n}\right\}$, we define a relaxation of degree $k$ of an $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L U}$-concept description $C$ as follows: for a finite set $\mathcal{E}^{k} \subseteq \mathcal{E}$ with $\left|\mathcal{E}^{k}\right|=k, C$ is relaxed by adding the sets $E_{i_{j}} \in \mathcal{E}^{k}$ such that $E_{i_{j}} \sqcap C \sqsubseteq \perp$

$$
\rho_{\mathcal{E}}^{k}(C)=C \sqcup E_{i_{1}} \sqcup \cdots \sqcup E_{i_{k}} .
$$

Proposition 12. $\rho_{\mathcal{E}}^{k}$ is extensive.
Proof. Extensivity of this operator follows directly from the definition.
However, exhaustivity is not necessarily satisfied unless the exception set includes the $T$ concept, or the disjunction of some or all of its elements entails the $T$ concept.

If we consider again Example 2, a relaxation of the formula BIRD $\sqsubseteq$ FLIEs using the operator $\rho_{\mathcal{E}}^{k}$ over the concept flies with the exception set $\mathcal{E}=\{$ Tweety $\}$ results in the formula bird $\sqsubseteq$ flies $\sqcup$ Tweety. The new revised knowledge base, if Condition 3 in Definition 7 is not considered, is then \{TWEETY $\sqsubseteq$ BIRD, BIRD $\sqsubseteq$ FLIES $\sqcup$ TWEETY, TWEETY $\sqcap$ FLIES $\sqsubseteq \perp$ \} which is consistent. This is obviously a more refined revision than the one obtained from the operator $\rho_{\perp}$, but requires the logic to be equipped with the disjunction connective and the definition of a set of exceptions.

Another example involving this relaxation will be discussed in the $\mathcal{A L C}$ case (cf. Example 4).

### 4.4.4. Relaxation and retraction in $\mathcal{A L C}$

We consider here operators suited to $\mathcal{A L C}$ language. Of course, all the operators defined for $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$ and $\mathcal{E L U}$ remain valid.
$\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}$-concept retractions. A first possibility for defining retraction is to remove iteratively from an $\mathcal{A L C}$-concept description one or a set of its subconcepts. A similar construction has been introduced in [29]. Interestingly enough, almost all the operators defined in $[20,29]$ are relaxations.

Definition 17 (Retraction from exceptions in $\mathcal{A L C}$ ). Given a set of exceptions $\mathcal{E}=\left\{E_{1}, \cdots, E_{n}\right\}$, we retract any $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}$-concept description $C$ by constraining it to the elements $E_{i}^{c}$ such that $E_{i} \sqsubseteq C$ :

$$
\kappa_{\mathcal{E}}^{\eta}(C)=C \sqcap E_{1}^{c} \sqcap \cdots \sqcap E_{n}^{c} .
$$

Proposition 13. $\kappa_{\mathcal{E}}^{n}$ is anti-extensive.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the definition.

As for its counterpart relaxation $\left(\rho_{\mathcal{E}}^{k}\right)$, exhaustivity of $\kappa_{\mathcal{E}}^{n}$ is not necessarily satisfied unless the exception set includes the $\perp$ concept, or the conjunction of some or all of its elements entails the $\perp$ concept.

Consider again Example 2. We have $\kappa_{\mathcal{E}}^{1}(\operatorname{BIRD})=\operatorname{BIRD} \cap$ TWEETY $^{c}$. The resulting revised knowledge base, if Condition 3 in Definition 7 is not considered, is then \{Tweety $\sqsubseteq$ Bird, Bird $\sqcap$ Tweety $^{c} \sqsubseteq$ Flies, Tweety $\sqcap$ FLies $\sqsubseteq \perp$ \} which is consistent.

Another possibility, suggested in [20] and related to operators defined in propositional logic as introduced in [7], consists in applying the retraction at the atomic level. This captures somehow Dalal's idea of revision operators in propositional logic [10].

Definition 18. Let $C$ be an $\mathcal{A L C}$-concept description of the form $Q_{1} r_{1} \cdots Q_{m} r_{m} . D$, where $Q_{i}$ is a quantifier and $D$ is quantifier-free and in CNF form, ${ }^{8}$ i.e. $D=E_{1} \sqcap E_{2} \sqcap \cdots E_{n}$ with $E_{i}$ being disjunctions of possibly negated atomic concepts, i.e. $E_{i}=\sqcup_{k \in \Xi(i)} A_{k}$, where $\Xi(i)$ is the index set of the atomic (possibly negated) concepts $A_{k}$ forming $E_{i}$. We define, as in the propositional case [7], $\kappa\left(E_{i}\right)=\Pi_{k \in \Xi(i)} \sqcup_{j \in \Xi(i) \backslash\{k\}} A_{j}$ and $\kappa_{p}^{n}(D)=\sqcap_{i \in\{1 \ldots n\}} \kappa\left(E_{i}\right)$. Then we set $\kappa_{\text {Dalal }}(C)=Q_{1} r_{1} \cdots Q_{m} r_{m} \cdot \kappa_{p}(D)$.

Proposition 14. $\kappa_{\text {Dalal }}^{n}$ is a retraction.
Proof. Exhaustivity and anti-extensivity follow from those of $\kappa_{p}$. Indeed the operator $\kappa_{p}$ is exhaustive and anti-extensive, and if applied $n$ times it reaches the $\perp$ concept (see [7] for properties of this operator).

This idea can be generalized to consider any retraction defined in $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L U}$.
Definition 19. Let $C$ be an $\mathcal{A L C}$-concept description of the form $Q_{1} r_{1} \cdots Q_{m} r_{m} . D$, where $Q_{i}$ is a quantifier and $D$ is quantifier-free.

Then we define $\kappa_{\cap}(C)=Q_{1} r_{1} \cdots Q_{m} r_{m} \cdot \kappa_{\mathcal{E}}^{n}(D)$.
Proposition 15. $\kappa_{\cap}^{n}$ is anti-extensive.
Proof. The properties of this operator follows from the ones of $\kappa_{\mathcal{E}}^{n}(D)$. Hence, anti-extensivity is verified but not necessarily exhaustivity.

Another possible $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}$-concept description retraction is obtained by substituting the existential restriction by an universal one. This idea has been sketched in [20] for defining dilation operators by transforming $\forall$ into $\exists$, i.e. special relaxation operators enjoying additional properties [14], and also used for defining revision in FOL (see Section 4.3). We adapt it here, by transforming $\exists$ into $\forall$, to define retraction in DL syntax.

Definition 20. Let $C$ be an $\mathcal{A L C}$-concept description of the form $Q_{1} r_{1} \cdots Q_{n} r_{n} . D$, where $Q_{i}$ is a quantifier, $D$ is quantifierfree, then we define

$$
\left.\kappa_{q}(C)=\right\rceil\left\{Q_{1}^{\prime} r_{1} \cdots Q_{n}^{\prime} r_{n} . D \mid \exists j \leq n \text { s.t. } Q_{j}=\exists \text { and } Q_{j}^{\prime}=\forall, \text { and for all } i \leq n \text { s.t. } i \neq j, Q_{i}^{\prime}=Q_{i}\right\}
$$

Proposition 16. $\kappa_{q}$ is anti-extensive.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that for $\kappa_{q}$ exhaustivity can be obtained by further removing recursively the remaining universal quantifiers and apply at the final step any retraction defined above on the concept $D$.
$\mathcal{A L C}$-concept relaxations. Let us now introduce some relaxation operators suited to $\mathcal{A L C}$ language.
Definition 21. Let $C$ be an $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}$-concept description of the form $Q_{1} r_{1} \cdots Q_{m} r_{m} . D$, where $Q_{i}$ is a quantifier and $D$ is quantifier-free and in DNF form, i.e. $D=E_{1} \sqcup E_{2} \sqcup \cdots E_{n}$ with $E_{i}$ being a conjunction of possibly negated atomic concepts, i.e. $E_{i}=\Pi_{k \in \Xi(i)} A_{k}$, where $\Xi(i)$ is the index set of the atomic (possibly negated) concepts $A_{k}$ forming $E_{i}$. We define $\rho\left(E_{i}\right)=$ $\sqcup_{k \in \Xi(i)} \sqcap_{j \in \Xi(i) \backslash\{k\}} A_{j}$ and $\rho_{p}^{n}(D)=\sqcup_{i \in\{1 \ldots n\}} \rho\left(E_{i}\right)$, as in the propositional case [7], and then $\rho_{\text {Dalal }}^{n}(C)=Q_{1} r_{1} \cdots Q_{m} r_{m} . \rho_{p}^{n}(D)$.

As for retraction, this idea can be generalized to consider any relaxation defined in $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L U}$.
Definition 22. Let $C$ be an $\mathcal{A L C}$-concept description of the form $Q_{1} r_{1} \cdots Q_{n} r_{n}$. $D$, where $Q_{i}$ is a quantifier and $D$ is quantifier-free, then we define $\rho_{\cup}^{n}(C)=Q_{1} r_{1} \cdots Q_{n} r_{n} \cdot \rho_{\mathcal{E}}^{n}(D)$.

[^6]Let us consider another example adapted from the literature to illustrate these operators [29].
Example 4. Let us consider the following knowledge bases: $T=\{$ Bob $\sqsubseteq \forall$ HasChild.rich, Bob $\sqsubseteq \exists$ hasChild.Mary, Mary $\sqsubseteq$ RICH $\}$ and $T^{\prime}=\left\{\right.$ Вов $\sqsubseteq$ HASChild.John, John $\left.\sqsubseteq \mathrm{RICH}^{c}\right\}$ (we consider here individuals as concepts). Relaxing the formula Bов $\sqsubseteq \forall$ HASChiLD.RICH by applying $\rho_{\cup}^{n}$ to the concept on the right hand side results in the following formula Bob $\sqsubseteq$ $\forall$ HASCHILD. (RICH $\sqcup \mathrm{JOHN})$ which resolves the conflict between the two knowledge bases.

A last possibility, dual to the retraction operator given in Definition 20, consists in transforming universal quantifiers into existential ones (as done for relaxation in FOL in Section 4.3).

Definition 23. Let $C$ be an $\mathcal{A L C}$-concept description of the form $Q_{1} r_{1} \cdots Q_{n} r_{n} . D$, where $Q_{i}$ is a quantifier and $D$ is quantifier-free, then we define a relaxation as:

$$
\rho_{q}(C)=\bigsqcup\left\{Q_{1}^{\prime} r_{1} \cdots Q_{n}^{\prime} r_{n} . D \mid \exists j \leq n \text { s.t. } Q_{j}=\forall \text { and } Q_{j}^{\prime}=\exists, \text { and for all } i \leq n \text { s.t. } i \neq j, Q_{i}^{\prime}=Q_{i}\right\}
$$

If we consider again Example 4, relaxing the formula Bob $\sqsubseteq \forall$ HASChild.rich by applying $\rho_{q}$ to the concept on the right hand side results in the following formula Вов $\sqsubseteq \exists$ нАSСнild.rich, which resolves the conflict between the two knowledge bases.

Proposition 17. The operators $\rho_{\text {Dalal }}$ and $\rho_{q}$ are extensive and exhaustive. The operator $\rho_{\cup}$ is extensive but not exhaustive.

Proof. The properties of $\rho_{\text {Dalal }}$ and $\rho_{\cup}$ are directly derived from the definitions and from properties of $\rho_{p}$ detailed in [7] and $\rho_{\mathcal{E}}$. The proof of $\rho_{q}$ being extensive and exhaustive can be found in [20].

## 5. Related work

Recently a first generalization of AGM revision has been proposed in the framework of Tarskian logics considering minimality criteria on removed formulas [34] following previous works of the same authors for contraction [35]. Representation results that make a correspondence between a large family of logics containing non-classical logics such as DL and HCL and AGM postulates for revision with such minimality criteria have then been obtained. Here, the proposed generalization also gives similar representation theorems (cf. Theorem 1) but for a different minimality criterion. Indeed, we showed in Section 3.2 that revision operators satisfying the weakened AGM postulates are precisely the ones that accomplish an update with minimal change to the set of models of knowledge bases, generalizing the approach developed in [22] for the logic PL and [30] for DL. However, our revision operator based on relaxation also has a minimality criterion on transformed formulas. Indeed, a simple consequence of Definition 7 is the property
(Relevance) Let $T, T^{\prime} \subseteq$ Sen be two knowledge bases such that $T \circ T^{\prime}=\rho^{\mathcal{K}}(T) \cup T^{\prime}$. Then, for every $\varphi \in T$ such that $k_{\varphi} \neq 0$, $\rho^{\mathcal{K}^{\prime}}(T) \cup T^{\prime}$ is inconsistent for $\mathcal{K}^{\prime}=\mathcal{K} \backslash\left\{k_{\varphi}\right\} \cup\left\{k_{\varphi}^{\prime}=0\right\}$.

This property states that only formulas that contribute to inconsistencies with $T^{\prime}$ are allowed to be transformed. Our property (Relevance) is similar to the property with the same name in [34,35], but for contraction operators, and that states that only the formulas that somehow "contribute" to derive the formulas to abandon can be removed.

Since the primary aim of this paper is to show that a more general framework, encompassing different logics, can be useful, it is out of the scope of this paper to provide an overview of all existing relaxation methods. However, some works deserve to be mentioned, since they are based on ideas that show some similarity with the relaxation notion proposed in our framework.

The relaxation idea originates from the work on Morpho-Logics, initially introduced in [7,8]. In this seminal work, revision operators (and explanatory relations) were defined through dilation and erosion operators. These operators share some similarities with relaxation and retraction as defined in this paper. Dilation is a sup-preserving operator and erosion is infpreserving, hence both are increasing. Some particular dilations and erosions are exhaustive and extensive while relaxation and retraction operators are defined to be exhaustive and extensive but not necessarily sup- and inf-preserving. Dilation has been further exploited for merging first-order theories in [20].

In [1], the notion of partial meet contraction is defined as the intersection of a non-empty family of maximal subsets of the theory that do not imply the proposition to be eliminated. Revision is then defined from the Levi identity. The maximal subsets can also be selected according to some choice function. The authors also define a notion of partial meet revision, which can be seen as a special case of the relaxation operator introduced in this paper. In [21], the author also discusses choice functions and compares the postulates for partial meet revision to the AGM postulates. He also highlights the distinction between belief sets (which can be very large) and belief bases (which are not necessarily closed by Cn). More precisely, $A$ is a belief base of a belief set $K$ iff $K=C n(A)$. A permissive belief revision is defined in [9], based on the
notion of weakening. The beliefs which are suppressed by classical revision methods are replaced by weaker forms, which keep the resulting belief set consistent. This notion of weakening is closed to the one of relaxation developed in this paper. In the last decade, several works have studied revision operators in description logics. While most of them concentrated on the adaptation of the AGM theory, few works have addressed the definition of concrete operators [25,27-29]. For instance, in [25], based on the seminal work in [5], revision in DL is studied by defining strategies to manage inconsistencies and using the notion of knowledge integration (see also the work by Hansson). The authors propose a conjunctive maxi-adjustment, for stratified knowledge bases and lexicographic entailment. In [28], weakening operators, that are in fact relaxation operators, are defined. Our work brings a principled formal flavor to these operators. In [27], revision of ontologies in DL is based on the notion of forgetting, which is also a way to manage inconsistencies. The authors propose a model based approach, inspired by Dalal's revision in PL, and based on a distance between terminologies and on the difference set between two interpretations. The models of the revision $T \circ T^{\prime}$ are then the interpretations $\mathcal{I}$ for which there exists an interpretation $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}$ such that the cardinality of the difference set between $\mathcal{I}$ and $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}$ is equal to the distance between $T$ and $T^{\prime}$. In [24], updating Aboxes in DL is discussed, and some operators are introduced. The rationality of these operators is not discussed, hence the interest of a formal theory such as the AGM postulates. In [2] an original use of DL revision is introduced for the orchestration of processes. A closely related field is inconsistency handling in ontologies (e.g. [36,37]), with the main difference that the rationality of inconsistency repairing operators is not investigated, as suggested by the AGM theory.

As previously highlighted, some of our DL-based relaxation operators are closely related to the ones introduced in [29] for knowledge bases revision. Our relaxation-based revision framework, being abstract enough (i.e. defined through easily satisfied properties), encompasses these operators. Moreover, the revision operator defined in [29] considers only inconsistencies due to Abox assertions. Our operators are general in the sense that Abox assertions are handled as any formula of the language.

## 6. Conclusion

The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we provided a generalization of AGM postulates, in a slightly weaker form from a model-theoretic point of view, in the abstract model theory of satisfaction systems, so as they become applicable to a wide class of non-classical logics. In this framework, we then generalized to any satisfaction systems the characterization of the AGM postulates given by Katsuno and Mendelzon for propositional logic in terms of minimal change with respect to an ordering among interpretations. This work generalizes the previous ones in the area. It also suggests the theory behind satisfaction systems to be a principled framework for dealing with knowledge dynamics with the growing interest on non-classical logics such as DL. We do hope that bridges can thus be built, by working at the cross-road of different areas of theoretical computer science.

Secondly, we proposed a general framework for defining revision operators based on the notion of relaxation. We demonstrated that such a relaxation-based framework for belief revision satisfies the weakened AGM postulates. As a byproduct, we give a principled formal flavor to several operators defined in the literature (e.g. weakening operators defined in DL).

Thirdly, we introduced a number of concrete relaxations within the scope of description logics, discussed their properties and illustrated them through simple examples. It was out of the scope of this paper to discuss languages such as OWL. However, the proposed approach could be applied to SROIQ and implemented in OWL, by augmenting a relaxation with operations on complex constructors.

Future works will concern the study of the complexity of the introduced operators, the comparison of their induced ordering, and their generalization to more expressive DL as well as other non-classical logics such as first-order Horn logics or equational logics.

Finally, there is an extension of satisfaction systems that takes into account explicitly the notion of signatures, the theory of institutions [19], a categorical model theory which has emerged in computing science studies of software specifications and semantics. In this paper, as we have considered logical theories over a same signature, signature morphisms and their interpretation for model classes and sentence sets were not relevant. However, these results carry over to institutions, which are indexed satisfaction systems.

## Appendix. Proofs of the main results

Proof of Proposition 3. Let us suppose that $\operatorname{Cn}\left(T_{1}^{\prime}\right)=\operatorname{Cn}\left(T_{2}^{\prime}\right)$. Here, three cases have to be considered:
(1) One of $T_{1}^{\prime}$ and $T_{2}^{\prime}$ is inconsistent (say $T_{1}^{\prime}$ without loss of generality). Since $C n\left(T_{1}^{\prime}\right)=C n\left(T_{2}^{\prime}\right)$ by hypothesis, $T_{2}^{\prime}$ is also inconsistent. By Postulate (G2), we then have that, for $i=1,2, \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T_{i}^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T_{i}^{\prime}\right)$, and $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T_{i}^{\prime}\right)=\operatorname{Triv}$ (Corollary 1). Hence $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T_{i}^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Triv}$, and $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T_{1}^{\prime}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T_{2}^{\prime}\right)=$ Triv.
(2) Both $T \cup T_{1}^{\prime}$ and $T \cup T_{1}^{\prime}$ are consistent. Since $\operatorname{Cn}\left(T_{1}^{\prime}\right)=\operatorname{Cn}\left(T_{2}^{\prime}\right)$, we know that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T_{1}^{\prime}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(T_{2}^{\prime}\right)$ (Equation (1)), and then $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \cup T_{1}^{\prime}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \cup T_{2}^{\prime}\right)$. Therefore, by Postulate $(G 3)$, we have that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T_{1}^{\prime}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T_{2}^{\prime}\right)$.
(3) $T_{1}^{\prime}$ and $T_{2}^{\prime}$ are consistent but $T \cup T_{1}^{\prime}$ or $T \cup T_{2}^{\prime}$ is not (say $T \cup T_{1}^{\prime}$ ). From $\operatorname{Cn}\left(T_{1}^{\prime}\right)=\operatorname{Cn}\left(T_{2}^{\prime}\right)$, we derive that $T \cup T_{2}^{\prime}$ is also inconsistent. By Postulate (G1), both $T \circ T_{1}^{\prime}$ and $T \circ T_{2}^{\prime}$ are consistent. Let $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T_{1}^{\prime}\right)$. If $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Triv}$, then obviously $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T_{2}^{\prime}\right)$. Therefore, let us suppose that $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Triv}$. By Postulate (G2), $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T_{1}^{\prime}\right)$, and then $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T_{2}^{\prime}\right)$. Let $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T_{2}^{\prime}\right) \backslash$ Triv. Such a model exists as $T \circ T_{2}^{\prime}$ is consistent. By Postulate (G2) and the
hypothesis that $C n\left(T_{1}^{\prime}\right)=C n\left(T_{2}^{\prime}\right),\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}$ contains both $T_{1}^{\prime}$ and $T_{2}^{\prime}$. Obviously, we have that $\left(T \circ T_{1}^{\prime}\right) \cup\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}$ and $\left(T \circ T_{2}^{\prime}\right) \cup\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}$ are consistent. Therefore, by Postulates (G5) and (G6), we have that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(\left(T \circ T_{1}^{\prime}\right) \cup\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)=$ $\operatorname{Mod}\left(\left(T \circ\left(T_{1}^{\prime} \cup\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)\right.\right.$ and $\operatorname{Mod}\left(\left(T \circ T_{2}^{\prime}\right) \cup\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(\left(T \circ\left(T_{2}^{\prime} \cup\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}(T \circ\right.\right.$ $\left.\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)$. We can then derive that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(\left(T \circ T_{1}^{\prime}\right) \cup\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(\left(T \circ T_{2}^{\prime}\right) \cup\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)$, and conclude that $\mathcal{M} \in$ $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T_{2}^{\prime}\right)$. Similarly, by reversing the roles of $T_{1}^{\prime}$ and $T_{2}^{\prime}$, if $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T_{2}^{\prime}\right)$, we can conclude that $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T_{1}^{\prime}\right)$.

## Proof of Theorem 1.

(1) Let us suppose that o satisfies AGM Postulates. For every knowledge base $T$, let us define the binary relation $\preceq_{T} \subseteq$ $\operatorname{Mod} \times \operatorname{Mod}$ by: for all $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}$,

$$
\mathcal{M} \preceq_{T} \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \text { iff }\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\text { either } \mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T) \\
\text { or } \mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right) \text { and } \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \notin \operatorname{Triv}
\end{array}\right.
$$

Let us first show that $\preceq_{T}$ satisfies the two conditions of FA.

- The first condition easily follows from the definition of $\preceq_{T}$.
- To prove the second one, let us assume that $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$ and $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \notin \operatorname{Mod}(T)$. Since $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$, we have $\mathcal{M} \preceq_{t} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$. Here two cases have to be considered:
(a) $\mathcal{M} \in$ Triv. In this case, we directly have by definition that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \not \varliminf_{T} \mathcal{M}$.
(b) $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Triv}$. Then $T \cup\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}$ is consistent since $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$ and $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(\mathcal{M}^{*}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)$. Then by Postulate (G3), we have that $T \circ\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}=T \cup\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}$. Therefore, we have that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \notin \operatorname{Mod}(T \circ$ $\left.\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)$, and $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \not \varliminf_{T} \mathcal{M}$.
Hence $\mathcal{M} \prec_{T} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ in both cases.
Let us now prove the three supplementary conditions.
- First, let us show that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)=\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$. If $T^{\prime}$ is inconsistent, then by Proposition $2 \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash$ $\operatorname{Triv}=\emptyset$, and by $(\mathrm{G} 2) \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Triv}$, hence $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}=\emptyset=\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq T\right)$. Let us assume now that $T^{\prime}$ is consistent.
- Let us first show that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv} \subseteq \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq T\right)$. Let $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$. Let us assume that $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$. By (G2), $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$. By hypothesis, there exists $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$ such that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \prec_{T} \mathcal{M}$. Here, two cases have to be considered:
(a) $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$. As $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$, then $T \cup T^{\prime}$ is consistent, and then by (G3), $T \circ T^{\prime}=T \cup T^{\prime}$. Thus, $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$, and then $\mathcal{M} \preceq_{T} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$, which is a contradiction.
(b) $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \notin \operatorname{Mod}(T)$. By definition of $\preceq_{T}$, this means that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)$. As $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$, by Postulate (G2), $\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}$ is consistent, and then by Postulates (G5) and (G6), we have that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)$. By the hypothesis that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \prec_{T} \mathcal{M}$, we can deduce that $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)$, whence by Postulate (G6) we have that $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$, which is a contradiction.
Finally we can conclude that $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$, and then $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv} \subseteq \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$. Let us now show that $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$. Let $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$. Let us assume that $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$. As $T^{\prime}$ is consistent, by Postulates (G1) and (G2), there exists $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)$ such that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime *} \neq \operatorname{Sen}$, and $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$. Since $T^{\prime} \subseteq\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}$, we also have that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime} \cup\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)=$ $\operatorname{Mod}\left(\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)$. By Postulates $(\mathrm{G} 5)$ and $(\mathrm{G} 6)$, we can write $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cap \operatorname{Mod}\left(\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)$, since $\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}$ is consistent. Hence, $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ\left\{\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime}\right\}^{*}\right)$, and then $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \prec_{T} \mathcal{M}$, which is a contradiction. We can conclude that $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$, and then $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$.
- Secondly, let us show that $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right) \neq \emptyset$ if $T^{\prime}$ is consistent. By Postulate (G1), we have that $T \circ T^{\prime}$ is consistent, and then $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv} \neq \emptyset$. We can directly conclude by the previous point that $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash\right.$ Triv, $\left.\preceq_{T}\right) \neq \emptyset$.
- Finally, let us show that for every $T^{\prime}, T^{\prime \prime} \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}, \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right) \cap \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime \prime}\right)=\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$ if $\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}$ is consistent. By (G5) and (G6), we have that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)$. Therefore, by the first point, we can directly conclude that $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq \preceq_{T}\right) \cap \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime \prime}\right)=\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$.
(2) Let us now suppose that for a revision operation o there exists a FA which maps any knowledge base $T \subseteq$ Sen to a binary relation $\preceq_{T} \subseteq \operatorname{Mod} \times \operatorname{Mod}$ satisfying the three conditions of Theorem 1 . Let us prove that $\circ$ verifies the AGM Postulates.
(G1) This postulate directly results from the fact that $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right) \neq \emptyset$ when $T^{\prime}$ is consistent, hence $\operatorname{Mod}(T \circ$ $\left.T^{\prime}\right) \backslash$ Triv $\neq \emptyset$.
(G2) Let $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)$. If $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Triv}$, then obviously $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$. Now, if $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Triv}$, then by definition, $\mathcal{M} \in$ $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$. This means that $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$.
(G3) Suppose that $T \cup T^{\prime}$ is consistent (hence $\left.\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \cup T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv} \neq \emptyset\right)$.
- Let us first prove that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \cup T^{\prime}\right)$. Let $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)$. Here two cases have to be considered: (a) $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Triv}$. In this case, we obviously have that $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \cup T^{\prime}\right)$.
(b) $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Triv}$. By definition, $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \leq_{T}\right)$. Hence, we have that $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$. Let us suppose now that $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Mod}(T)$. As $T$ is consistent, $\operatorname{Mod}(T) \backslash \operatorname{Triv} \neq \emptyset$ by Proposition 2 . Therefore, there exists $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$ such that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \prec_{T} \mathcal{M}$ (from $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Mod}(T)$ and the second property of FA ), which is a contradiction. Hence $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$ and $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \cup T^{\prime}\right)$.
- Let us now prove that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \cup T^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)$. Let $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \cup T^{\prime}\right)$ such that $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)$. Therefore, $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$. By hypothesis, there exists $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash$ Triv such that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \prec_{T} \mathcal{M}\left(\right.$ since $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash\right.$ Triv, $\left.\preceq_{T}\right)$ ), and then $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \notin \operatorname{Mod}(T)$ by the first condition of FA. However, by the second condition of FA, we have that $\mathcal{M} \prec_{T} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$, which is a contradiction.
Finally, we can conclude that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \cup T^{\prime}\right)$.
(G5) Let $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cap \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime \prime}\right)$. Let us assume that $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$. This means that $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Triv}$ or there exists $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)$ such that $\mathcal{M}^{*} \neq \operatorname{Sen}$ and $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \prec_{T} \mathcal{M}$. In the first case, we obviously have that $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)$. In the second case, we then have that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$, and then $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \not \kappa_{T} \mathcal{M}$ since $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$, which is a contradiction.
(G6) Let us suppose that $\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}$ is consistent. Let $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)$. By hypothesis, either $\mathcal{M} \in T r i v$ and in this case, obviously we have that $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)$, or $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$ as $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ\left(T^{\prime} \cup\right.\right.$ $\left.\left.T^{\prime \prime}\right)\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}=\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq T\right)$. As $\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}$ is consistent, we have that $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}\right.$, $\left.\preceq_{T}\right)=\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{\tau}\right) \cap \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime \prime}\right)$ and then $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)$.

Proof of Theorem 2. First, let us show that $f$ is a FA.

- Let $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$. Let us suppose that $\mathcal{M} \prec_{T} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$. This means that there exists $T^{\prime} \subseteq$ Sen such that $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in$ $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right), \mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)$ and $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \notin \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)$. Hence we have that $T \cup T^{\prime}$ is consistent, and then by Postulate (G3), $T \circ T^{\prime}=T \cup T^{\prime}$. We then have that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)$ which is a contradiction.
- Let $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$ and let $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod} \backslash \operatorname{Mod}(T)$. We have that $\mathcal{M} \preceq_{T}^{\emptyset} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$, and then $\mathcal{M} \preceq_{T} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ by definition of $\preceq_{T}$. Now, let us suppose that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \preceq_{T} \mathcal{M}$. This means that there exists $T^{\prime} \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}$ such that $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right), \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)$ and $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)$. But, as $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$, we have that $T \cup T^{\prime}$ is consistent, and then by Postulate ( G 3 ), $T \circ T^{\prime}=T \cup T^{\prime}$. Hence, we have that $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)$ which is a contradiction.

Let us show now the supplementary conditions of Theorem 1 .

- First, let us show that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}=\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$. The case where $T^{\prime}$ is inconsistent follows the same proof as in Theorem 1.
Let us suppose that $T^{\prime}$ is consistent. Let $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$. Let us suppose that $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$. This means that there exists $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash$ Triv such that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \prec_{T} \mathcal{M}$. Therefore, there exists $T^{\prime \prime} \subseteq$ Sen such that $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime \prime}\right), \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime \prime}\right)$ and $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime \prime}\right)$. Hence, both $\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}$ and $\left(T \circ T^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime}$ are consistent, and then by Postulates (G5) and (G6), $\operatorname{Mod}\left(\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(\left(T \circ T^{\prime \prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)$. We can then derive that $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime \prime}\right)$ which is a contradiction.
Let $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$. Let us suppose that $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$. As $T^{\prime}$ is consistent, by Postulates (G1) and (G2), there exists $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash$ Triv. By definition of $\preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime}}$, we have that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime}} \mathcal{M}$, and then $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \preceq_{T} \mathcal{M}$ which is a contradiction.
- The proof of the two other conditions corresponds to the one given in Theorem 1.

Proof of Proposition 4. It is sufficient to show that $\preceq_{T}^{1} \cup \preceq_{T}^{2}$ and $\preceq_{T}^{1} \cap \preceq_{T}^{2}$ satisfy Conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 4 plus all the conditions of Theorem 1.

Let us first show that they are FA. Let $T \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}$. Let $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$. By definition of $F A$, then we have either $\mathcal{M} \not{ }_{T}^{i} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ and $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \not \varliminf_{T}^{i} \mathcal{M}$ or $\mathcal{M} \leq_{T}^{i} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ and $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \leq_{T}^{i} \mathcal{M}$ for $i=1$, 2. We then have four cases to consider, but for $f_{1} \sqcap f_{2}(T)=\preceq_{T}$ (resp. $f_{1} \sqcup f_{2}(T)=\preceq_{T}$ ), we always end up at either $\mathcal{M} \npreceq_{T} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ and $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \npreceq T \mathcal{M}$ or $\mathcal{M} \preceq_{T} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ and $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \preceq_{T} \mathcal{M}$. Likewise, for every $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$ and every $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod} \backslash \operatorname{Mod}(T)$, we have that $\mathcal{M} \prec_{T}^{i} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ for $i=1$, 2 . Therefore, it is obvious to conclude that $\mathcal{M} \prec_{T} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$.

Now, by the first supplementary condition for $\preceq_{T}^{1}$ and $\preceq_{T}^{2}$ in Theorem 1 , we have for every $T^{\prime} \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}$ that $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash\right.$ $\left.\operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}^{1}\right)=\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}^{2}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$. Hence, we can write that $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}^{1} \cup \preceq_{T}^{2}\right)=$ $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}^{1} \cap \preceq_{T}^{2}\right)=\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}^{i}\right)$ for $i=1,2$. The three supplementary conditions are then straightforward, and this allows us to directly conclude that $f_{1} \sqcup f_{2}$ and $f_{1} \sqcap f_{2}$ are FA+.

Proof of Theorem 3. o obviously satisfies Postulates (G1), (G2) and (G3). To prove (G5)-(G6), let us suppose $T, T^{\prime}, T^{\prime \prime} \subseteq$ Sen such that $\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}$ is consistent (the case where $\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}$ is inconsistent is obvious). This means that $\rho^{\mathcal{K} T_{T}^{\prime}}(T) \cup T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}$ is consistent. Now, obviously we have that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$. Hence, by the second and the third conditions of Definition 7, we necessarily have that $T \circ\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)=\rho^{\mathcal{K}_{T}^{T^{\prime}}}(T) \cup T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}$, and then $\operatorname{Mod}\left(\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)$.

Proof of Theorem 4. Let $T \subseteq$ Sen. Let us first show that $f_{\rho}(T)=\preceq_{T}$ is faithful.

- Obviously, we have for every $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$ and every $T^{\prime} \subseteq$ Sen that both $\mathcal{M} \nVdash_{T}^{T^{\prime}} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ and $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \npreceq T_{T}^{\prime} \mathcal{M}$. Hence the same relations hold for $\preceq_{T}$.
- Let $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(T)$ and let $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod} \backslash \operatorname{Mod}(T)$. Obviously, we have that $\mathcal{M} \leq_{T}^{\emptyset} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$. Let $T^{\prime} \subseteq$ Sen such that $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in$ $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$ (the case where for all $T^{\prime} \subseteq \operatorname{Sen} \mathcal{M}$ or $\mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ is not in $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right)$ implies that $\mathcal{M}$ and $\mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ are incomparable by $\preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime}}$, and then we directly have that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \npreceq{ }_{T} \mathcal{M}$ ). Here two cases have to be considered:
(1) $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Triv}$. As $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \notin \operatorname{Mod}(T)$, then $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \notin \operatorname{Triv}$. Hence, there does not exist $\mathcal{K}^{\prime}<\mathcal{K}$ such that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(\rho^{\mathcal{K}^{\prime}}(T)\right)$. Otherwise, $\rho^{\mathcal{K}^{\prime}}(T) \cup T^{\prime}$ would be consistent, which would contradict the hypothesis that $T \circ T^{\prime}=\rho^{\mathcal{K}}(T) \cup T^{\prime}$.
(2) $\mathcal{M} \notin$ Triv. We have that $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \cup T^{\prime}\right)$ but $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \notin \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \cup T^{\prime}\right)$, and then $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \not \varliminf_{T}^{T^{\prime}} \mathcal{M}$ By definition of o.

Hence, in both cases we can conclude that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \npreceq T_{T} \mathcal{M}$.
Let us prove that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}=\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$. This will directly prove that $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right) \neq \emptyset$ when $T^{\prime}$ is consistent. Indeed, by definition, we have that $T \circ T^{\prime}$ is consistent when $T^{\prime}$ is consistent, and then $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash\right.$ $\left.\operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right) \neq \emptyset$ if $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}=\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$.

If $T^{\prime}$ is inconsistent, then so is $T \circ T^{\prime}$ by definition. Hence, $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}=\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq T\right)=\emptyset$. Let us now suppose that $T^{\prime}$ is consistent.

- Let us show that $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv} \subseteq \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$. Let $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$. Let $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$. Two cases have to be considered:
(1) $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)$. Obviously, we have both $\mathcal{M} \not \varliminf_{T}^{T^{\prime}} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$ and $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \not \varliminf_{T}^{T^{\prime}} \mathcal{M}$. Let us show that this is also true for every $T^{\prime \prime} \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}$ such that $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime \prime}\right)$. Let us suppose that there exists $T^{\prime \prime} \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}$ such that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime \prime}} \mathcal{M}$. By hypothesis, we then have that $\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}$ is consistent. Therefore, by Conditions 2 and 3 of Definition 7, we have that $\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}=T \circ\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)$. Hence, we also have that $T \circ\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)=\rho^{\mathcal{K}} T_{T}^{T^{\prime}}(T) \cup T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}$. Consequently, as $\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime \prime}\right)$, we have by Condition 3 of Definition 7 that $\mathcal{K}_{T}^{T^{\prime \prime}} \leq \mathcal{K}_{T}^{T^{\prime}}$. Therefore, as $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime \prime}} \mathcal{M}$, we can deduce that there exists $\mathcal{K}^{\prime \prime}<\mathcal{K}_{T}^{T^{\prime}}$ such that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(\rho^{\mathcal{K}}{ }^{\prime \prime}(T)\right)$. We then have that $\rho^{\mathcal{K}}(T) \cup T^{\prime}$ is consistent, and then by Condition 2 of Definition $7, \sum \mathcal{K}_{T}^{T^{\prime}} \leq \sum \mathcal{K}^{\prime \prime}$, which is a contradiction.
(2) $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \notin \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)$. By definition of $\preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime}}$, we have that $\mathcal{M} \preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime}} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$, and therefore $\mathcal{M} \preceq_{T} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$.

Finally, we can conclude that $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$.

- Let us now show that $\operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$. Let $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$. Let us suppose that $\mathcal{M} \notin \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$. As $T^{\prime}$ is consistent, then so is $T \circ T^{\prime}$. Hence, there exists $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}$. As $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Mod}\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right)$, we have that $\mathcal{M}^{\prime} \preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime}} \mathcal{M}$, and then as $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Min}\left(\operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime}\right) \backslash \operatorname{Triv}, \preceq_{T}\right)$ we also have that $\mathcal{M} \preceq_{T} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$. This means that there exists $T^{\prime \prime} \subseteq \operatorname{Sen}$ such that $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(T^{\prime \prime}\right)$ and $\mathcal{M} \preceq_{T}^{T^{\prime \prime}} \mathcal{M}^{\prime}$. By hypothesis, we then have that $\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}$ is consistent. Therefore, by Conditions 2 and 3 of Definition 7 , we have that $\left(T \circ T^{\prime}\right) \cup T^{\prime \prime}=$ $T \circ\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)$. Hence, we also have that $T \circ\left(T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}\right)=\rho^{\mathcal{K}} \mathbb{T}_{T}^{\prime}(T) \cup T^{\prime} \cup T^{\prime \prime}$. Consequently, we have by Condition 3 of Definition 7 that $\mathcal{K}_{T}^{T^{\prime \prime}} \leq \mathcal{K}_{T}^{T^{\prime}}$. Hence, there exists $\mathcal{K}^{\prime \prime} \geq \mathcal{K}_{T}^{T^{\prime \prime}}$ such that $\mathcal{K}^{\prime \prime}<\mathcal{K}_{T}^{T^{\prime}}$ and $\mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(\rho^{\prime \prime}(T)\right)$. We can then deduce that $\rho^{\mathcal{K}^{\prime \prime}}(T) \cup T^{\prime}$ is consistent, and then by Condition 2 of Definition 7 we have that $\sum \mathcal{K}_{T}^{T^{\prime}} \leq \sum \mathcal{K}^{\prime \prime}$, which is a contradiction.

Finally, to prove the last point, we follow the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 1.

Proof of Proposition 15. The proof relies on the following general result:

$$
\forall C, \forall r, \forall r . C \sqsubseteq \exists r . C
$$

Indeed, for each interpretation $\mathcal{I}$, if $r_{i}^{\mathcal{I}} \neq \emptyset$, we have

$$
x \in(\forall r . C)^{\mathcal{I}} \Rightarrow\left(\forall y,(x, y) \in r^{\mathcal{I}} \Rightarrow y \in C^{\mathcal{I}}\right) \Rightarrow\left(\exists y,(x, y) \in r^{\mathcal{I}} \text { and } y \in C^{\mathcal{I}}\right) \Rightarrow x \in(\exists r . C)^{\mathcal{I}} .
$$

Hence $(\forall r . C)^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq(\exists r . C)^{\mathcal{I}}$ for each $\mathcal{I}$ (if $r_{i}^{\mathcal{I}}=\emptyset$ it is obvious), and $\forall r . C \sqsubseteq \exists r . C$.
In a similar way, we can show, that for any $C_{1}, C_{2}, r$, and $Q \in\{\exists, \forall\}$ :

$$
C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2} \Rightarrow Q r \cdot C_{1} \sqsubseteq Q r . C_{2} .
$$

Now, let us consider any $j$ such that $Q_{j}=\exists$, and set $C^{\prime}=Q_{j+1} r_{j+1} \ldots Q_{n} r_{n}$. D. We have from the first result $Q_{j}^{\prime} r_{j} . C^{\prime} \sqsubseteq$ $Q_{j} r_{j} \cdot C^{\prime}$. Applying the second result recursively on each $Q_{i}$ for $i<j$, we then have

$$
Q_{1} r_{1} \ldots Q_{j-1} r_{j-1} Q_{j}^{\prime} r_{j} . C^{\prime} \sqsubseteq Q_{1} r_{1} \ldots Q_{j-1} r_{j-1} Q_{j} r_{j} \cdot C^{\prime}
$$

The same relation holds for the conjunction over any $j$ such that $Q_{j}=\exists$, from which we conclude that $\forall C, \kappa_{q}(C) \sqsubseteq C$, i.e. $\kappa_{q}$ is anti-extensive.

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[^1]:    1 The set of logical symbols is defined in each particular logic, and does not depend on a theory.
    2 The description logic defined here is better known under the acronym $\mathcal{A L C}$.

[^2]:    3 The numbering is kept consistent with the ones in previous works.

[^3]:    ${ }^{4}$ Note that most systems have tautologies. An example without tautology would be a non-complete logic where the only connective is $\vee$.

[^4]:    ${ }^{5}$ We will see in Section 4.3 a less trivial but more interesting relaxation in FOL that consists in changing universal quantifiers into existential ones.

[^5]:    ${ }^{6}$ Definitions based on the notion of structuring elements are all particular cases of more general algebraic dilations, defined as operators between lattices, which commute with the supremum.
    ${ }^{7}$ Hence, a dilation of formulas could also be defined by using a distance ball of radius $n$ as structuring element [7].

[^6]:    ${ }^{8}$ Any concept can indeed be written in this prenex form.

