



Security-Aware Modeling and Analysis for HW/SW Partitioning

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Embedded System Security




SysML-Sec Methodology




TTool



An open source toolkit provided by




Secure HW/SW Partitioning



Drone Functional View



Drone Architecture






Security Mechanisms

Cryptographic Configurations

- Tag indicating presence of encryption
- Operate on tagged channel
- Occupies computation time in simulation



Setting Cryptographic Configuration properties

Properties

Cryptographic Configuration Name	<input type="text" value="encrypt"/>
Security Pattern	<input type="text" value="Symmetric Encryption"/> Use
<input type="text" value="Symmetric Encryption"/>	
Overhead	<input type="text"/>
Encryption Computational Complexity	<input type="text" value="100"/>
Decryption Computational Complexity	<input type="text" value="100"/>
Nonce	<input type="text"/> Use
<input type="text"/>	
Encrypted Key	<input type="text"/> Use
<input type="text"/>	




Automatic Generation


- Time-saving and convenient
- Suggestion of basic encryption for user to enhance
- Addition of Nonces, Encryption

Unsecured Model

Camera




Drone Control




Secured Model

Camera




Drone Control




Performance

~1800 cycles



Performance with Added Security

~3400 cycles






Security Analysis


Model Transformation for Security

Lugou Modelsward2016


Mapping Model



Intermediate Specification



Basic Blocks



Proverif Code

```



(* Generated ProVerif specification *)
(* Queries Secret *)
query attacker(new Alice__secretData).
(* Symmetric key cryptography *)
fun sencrypt (bitstring, bitstring): bitstring.
  reduc forall x: bitstring, k: bitstring; sdecrypt
  (sencrypt (x, k), k) = x.
...
let Alice_0 (sessionID: bitstring) =
  in (chControl, chControlData: bitstring);
  let (=sessionID, =call_Alice_0,
  Alice__secretData_1:
  ...
process
  ! ( new sessionID: bitstring; ((
  System_0 (sessionID)
  )) | (
  Bob_0 (sessionID) ) | ( Alice_0 (sessionID)
  )) | ( (
  new Alice__sk_data: bitstring;
  ...
  
```

Results





Backtracing to diagrams

Verification of model



Verification of Secured Model



Conclusion

- Modeling and verification of secure architectures
- Evaluation of security and impact of security on performance
- Automatic generation to secure critical communication
- Future support of code integrity, firewalls...

Our work at:

ttool.telecom-paristech.fr

sysml-sec.telecom-paristech.fr



Questions?